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Since the mid 1980s the analysis of large micro panel datasets on business units has
changed our understanding of the extent to which establishments and firms reoptimize
their input and output decisions in face of idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks to
technology and to input and output markets. The lesson that we have now learned
from this effort is that net aggregate changes hide an enormous amount of gross
additions and losses to inputs by individual firms. This suggests that firms are subject
to a wide range of idiosyncratic effects which leads to the coexistence of firms that
significantly add jobs and others that significantly reduce jobs, while in the aggregate
we find more smooth net changes. Because this process of job and worker reallocation
among businesses occurs in tightly defined sectors, it fundamentally reflects the need
to reoptimize the use of expensive resources by firms that suffer different fates in the
market. Efficient firms tend to expand and new firms enter the market leading to the
creation of jobs. Inefficient firms tend to contract and exit, leading to the destruction
of jobs. Simultaneously, for a given set of jobs, there is a large frequency of changes in
the workers attached to them, as firms and workers attempt a better match between
requirements and qualifications.
The patterns of this process of reallocation vary widely across classes of businesses
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units, defined in terms of age, size, ownership type and other characteristics. Small
and young businesses reallocate more than large and old business; net growth rates
are larger among small and young businesses; young and small businesses tend to
reallocate more in good times, whereas old and large businesses tend to reallocate
more in bad times. The composition of sectors in terms of classes of businesses also
varies significantly, with manufacturing being dominated by large and old firms, while
services is dominated by small and young firms.
An important property of the process of input reallocation is that it displays sub-
stantial lumpiness and intermittence at the micro-level, in contrast with the smooth
and sluggish adjustment observed at the aggregate level. This dynamic behavior is
usually rationalized by considering costs to adjustment in input markets. The macro-
level evidence on partial adjustment suggests convex costs which generate the sluggish
adjustment to shocks. However, we need some form of non-strictly convex adjustment
costs in order to generate the micro-level evidence on non-smooth adjustment. This
suggests that idiosyncratic shocks and non-strictly convex adjustment costs are able
to explain to explain the evidence both at the micro and macro level. Even if we are
interested in aggregate responses, the micro-level information can be very useful in
telling us how aggregate activity might change in response to macroeconomic shocks
that affect the distribution of firms.
This dissertation builds on the evidence on heterogeneity in labor reallocation,
and attempts to make some theoretical and empirical contributions. We use Quadros
de Pessoal, an administrative database with information on all firms, except for public
administration, with paid employees in the Portuguese economy. The database spans
the period from 1985 to 2000, and contains information on firms, establishments and
workers Since we are building macroeconomic patterns from micro-level adjustment,
our models use linear and nonconvex adjustment costs, and build aggregate patterns
from the intermittent and lumpy micro level adjustment that these costs imply.
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The dissertation is structured in three main chapters (2, 3, and 4) and we now
describe some contributions in each of them. The second chapter advances an ex-
planation for the recent empirical evidence that emphasizes post entry growth of
survivors, as opposed to exit of inefficient and small firms, as the main source of
growth over time in the average size of a cohort of entering firms. We suggest that
the interaction of adjustment costs with learning by entering firms about their true
efficiency gives them incentives to start small and adjust upwards as they learn they
are efficient. We consider linear and nonconvex adjustment costs, i.e., proportional
and fixed costs, and conclude that for many plausible configurations of adjustment
costs firms will start small and grow rapidly after entry. Initial uncertainty about
true profitability makes entering firms prudent since they want to avoid incurring
superfluous costs on jobs that prove to be excessive ex post. Even though there is
less pruning of inefficient firms, surviving firms will grow faster and therefore the
survivors’ contribution to growth in the cohort’s average size will increase.
We start by analyzing the 1988 cohort of entering firms in the Portuguese economy
and decompose the change in the cohort’s average size into a survivor component and
a selection component. We conclude that survivors have the highest contribution to
changes in the cohort’s average size. However, manufacturing and services are at op-
posite ends: initial selection is stronger and the survivor’s component is much smaller
in services than in manufacturing. We then provide simulations for a finite learning
horizon version of the model, with positive dispersion in entry size, and conclude that
adjustment costs are needed to account for a high survivors’ contribution. Finally, a
calibration of the model to the overall economy and the manufacturing and services
cohorts suggests that proportional costs and the fixed exit cost are key parameters
in matching the evidence on firm dynamics. Firms in manufacturing learn relatively
less initially about their efficiency, and are subject to much larger adjustment costs
than firms in services.
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Therefore, this chapter looks at heterogeneity along the age dimension, which is
implied by a learning-about-efficiency mechanism. We conclude that growth in the
average size of a cohort of entering firms is not merely the result of sample bias due to
a selection mechanism that censors the lower end of the size distribution, but instead
that surviving firms do tend to grow substantially, and a pure learning with selection
model cannot fully account for this evidence.
The third chapter analyzes to what extent does the composition in terms of het-
erogeneous classes of firms matter for aggregate job flows dynamics. The starting
point is that young and small firms, on the one hand, and old and large firms, on
the other hand, display quite different dynamics of gross job flows. Previous stud-
ies have identified an effect of the age and size distribution on the cyclical behavior
of reallocation, besides the simple trend effect as a simple (S,s) model of employ-
ment adjustment would indicate. Based on this, we reformulate an (S,s) model by
considering two types of firms that are structurally different, and obtain analytical
expressions for gross job flows statistics. We conclude that classes of firms whose
optimal employment tends to be relatively more affected by aggregate shocks than
by idiosyncratic shocks will influence aggregate job flow dynamics by more than their
sample weight, as is the case for their influence in average aggregate job flows.
We then analyze with Portuguese data which types of firms are relatively more
sensitive to aggregate shocks, and find that large and old firms are more sensitive than
young and small firms. Therefore, old and large firms determine aggregate job flow
dynamics by more than what their already large employment shares would indicate.
And because large and old firms have countercyclical reallocation whereas small and
young firms have procyclical reallocation, this tends to make aggregate job flows less
procyclical than otherwise. By looking at one-digit sectoral data, we find that the
particular behavior of old and large firms in each sector determines the aggregate
dynamics of gross job flows in that sector. Therefore, institutional, technological,
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and competitive restrictions determine the composition of each sector in terms of
classes of firms, and this decisively influences the aggregate cyclical dynamics of job
reallocation in the sector.
The fourth chapter provides basic facts concerning macroeconomic performance
and job reallocation for Portugal. We present statistics on gross job flows for the
overall economy, and describe how they respond to the business cycle. We analyze
the evolution of sectoral gross job flows and point out possible structural changes
occurring in some sectors. We also provide some evidence on gross job flow dynamics
by age and size classes. We conclude that patterns are significantly different across
sectors and age and size classes.
We conclude in chapter 5 by outlining the main contributions of this dissertation,




Firm Dynamics with Infrequent
Adjustment and Learning
2.1 Introduction
In recent years there has been a renewed interest in explaining patterns of firm dy-
namics. New longitudinal datasets have confirmed heterogeneities between firms of
different size and age. Small and young (surviving) firms tend to grow faster and have
higher failure rates than large and old firms, so that job destruction due to plant exit
and job creation due to the scaling-up of firm size decrease with age.1 Entering plants
tend to be small, but survivors grow rapidly after entry.2 These patterns differ sig-
nificantly across countries and sectors, suggesting that technological differences are
important, but that country specific factors also matter.3
The two broad types of explanations for these facts are theories based on selection
of inefficient and small firms, and theories based on financing constraints. Selection
1See Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1989a, 1989b).
2See Mata and Portugal (1994) and Cabral and Mata (2003).
3See Bartelsman, Scarpetta and Schivardi (2005). In particular, the US displays a size distri-
bution with much more dispersion, a smaller relative entry size, and hazard rates that decline less
steeply with age.
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theories stress the tendency for firms that accumulate bad realizations of productivity
to exit the market. This implies a composition bias towards larger more efficient firms
as smaller, inefficient, slow-growing firms gradually exit the industry. Meanwhile,
financing constraints theories argue that some imperfection in financial markets causes
young firms to have limited access to credit, forcing them to enter at a suboptimally
small scale. As firms get older and survive, they establish creditworthiness and build
up internal resources that enable them to expand to their optimal size.
Cabral and Mata (2003) provide some evidence on the empirical validity of these
theories for the Portuguese manufacturing sector. They find that the shift of a cohort’s
size distribution to the right is mostly due to growth of surviving firms rather than
exit of small firms. The authors suggest that a model with financial constraints
is better able to match these facts. This chapter tries to interpret this and other
cross-sector evidence from a different perspective. At the core of our theory is the
interaction of learning with adjustment costs. Unlike existing selection theories, our
model generates plausible cohort dynamics even in the absence of any pruning of
inefficient firms (e.g. when exit is not allowed), although allowing for exit amplifies
the effects of learning and adjustment costs on the contribution of survivors to growth
in the cohort’s average size.
Our contribution is twofold. We contribute to the empirical literature by introduc-
ing a decomposition of a cohort’s change in average size that allows a quick assessment
of the match between particular theories and data. We apply this decomposition to
the 1988 cohort of entrants in the Portuguese economy, using the Quadros de Pessoal
dataset. For the overall economy, we conclude that growth of survivors is the main
force behind the change in average firm size. However, there are significant cross-
sector differences in this measure. In particular, initial exit rates are smaller and
the survivors’ contribution to changes in size are much higher in manufacturing than
in services. We also find significant inaction and lumpiness in labor adjustments, in
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varying degrees across sectors. This suggests the presence of non-strictly convex costs
in labor adjustment that vary by sector, possibly due to technological heterogeneities.
We contribute to the theoretical literature by using this evidence to motivate
the introduction of linear and nonconvex adjustment costs into a model of Bayesian
learning about efficiency. Our model builds on Jovanovic (1982) by adding both pro-
portional and fixed costs that potentially apply not only to regular labor adjustment,
but also at entry and exit. We argue that under most forms of adjustment costs, firms
will have a tendency to start smaller and grow faster. We prove this analytically in
a simplified model in which there is no exit of firms. This shows that non-strictly
convex costs can generate firm growth without selection. When firms are allowed to
exit, selection intensifies the effects of adjustment costs on firm growth, while costs to
adjustment reduce exit rates. Therefore, adjustment costs increase the contribution
of surviving firms to growth in the cohort’s average size. All that is needed for firm
growth under linear and nonconvex costs is the existence of a learning environment
that generates a stochastic process for perceived efficiency with both persistence and
decreasing uncertainty in age. For example, firm growth would occur in our model
even if exit was random with a constant probability for all firms, whereas this would
not be true in a pure selection model.
The intuition for why firms grow faster and display smaller exit rates under most
forms of fixed and proportional costs is that initial uncertainty about true profitabil-
ity makes entering firms prudent; that is, they enter small and “wait and see” since
they want to avoid incurring superfluous entering/hiring costs and firing/shutdown
costs on jobs that prove to be excessive ex post. This implies that surviving firms will
grow faster, even though adjustment costs imply that there are fewer firms exiting the
market and therefore less pruning of inefficient firms. The assumption that entering
firms face a Bayesian learning problem concerning their efficiency is standard in selec-
tion theories and has been advanced as an explanation for the high rates of exit, job
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creation and job destruction among young firms. The initial literature on adjustment
costs used a convex specification in an attempt to explain the sluggishness in input
responses to aggregate shocks. However, the assumption that costs of adjustment are
linear and/or nonconvex is now standard in dynamic factor demand models, follow-
ing a number of studies since the late 1980s that have documented lumpiness and
inaction in adjustment at the micro level. Since strictly convex costs imply smooth
adjustments over time, whereas linear and nonconvex costs imply immediate adjust-
ment when it occurs, allowing for strictly convex costs instead of non-strictly convex
costs would make our argument stronger. In the case of hiring/entering costs, firms
would not adjust immediately to their optimal size, after changes in their perceived
productivity, but would do so gradually. For firing/exiting costs, firms experiencing
large negative shocks would want to adjust downwards in various steps, a scenario
that makes firms start smaller to attenuate its effects. Therefore, our decision to
assume only linear and nonconvex costs is conservative, and permits a simplification
of the methods employed to measure the effects of adjustment costs.
To assess our model quantitatively, we calibrate and simulate a finite learning
horizon version with positive dispersion in entry size, using recursive expressions for
all relevant densities and moments. We conclude that linear and nonconvex costs
can account for the high empirical contribution of survivors to changes in a cohort’s
average size. In particular, the key elements needed to match the evidence on firm
dynamics are the proportional costs and the fixed exit cost. The proportional costs
enable us to match the high value and flatness over age of the survivor component,
while the fixed exit cost enables us to reduce initial selection. A calibration to the
manufacturing and services cohorts in the Portuguese data also suggests that firms
in manufacturing learn relatively less initially about their efficiency, and are subject
to much larger setup and adjustment costs than firms in services.
The main implication of this chapter for economic policy is that substantial growth
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of survivors does not necessarily mean that some imperfection in capital markets
causes entering firms to be inefficiently undersized. On the contrary, small entry
size might be an optimal response by firms as they try to save on adjustment costs,
given the uncertainty about their long-run profitability. Therefore, any government
intervention in capital markets or incentives for larger entry size might be a waste of
resources. To the extent possible, these resources should alternatively be applied in
helping potential entrants better predict their post-entry efficiency. However, there
is an intrinsic random element in the creation of efficient firms, with respect to which
the government can do little. Taking into account the cross country evidence, another
implication of this chapter is that a particular set of institutional configurations that
potentially can be mapped into a particular structure of adjustment costs may explain
why firms enter bigger and experience smaller post-entry growth in some European
countries than in the US.
A short review of the literature follows. Representative papers of selection the-
ories are Jovanovic (1982) and Ericson and Pakes (1995). In Jovanovic (1982), ex
ante identical firms learn about their ex post average efficiency by observing their
performance. Because accumulation of market experience makes firms more reliant
on their Bayesian posterior estimate, the threshold productivity below which firms
exit is increasing in age. Therefore, inefficient firms gradually exit from the mar-
ket while efficient firms remain in the industry and adjust their employment level in
accordance with perceived productivity. The model predicts increasing average size
among surviving firms of a given cohort, and a decreasing failure rate with age. In
Ericson and Pakes (1995) the profitability of a firm is determined by the stochastic
outcomes of investment projects realized by the firm and its rivals, and by the com-
petitive environment in which firms interact. Therefore, firms must spend resources
in order to improve their relative position in the industry, and selection is partly an
endogenous process.
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With respect to financing constraints theories, two important contributions are
those of Cooley and Quadrini (2001) and Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004). In
Cooley and Quadrini (2001) productivity shocks are persistent, while there is a trans-
action cost on equity and a default cost on debt. This financial friction implies that
equity and debt are not perfect substitutes, so that size depends positively on the
amount of equity. Assuming that firms observe their efficiency before entering the in-
dustry, new firms will tend to be of high productivity and will borrowmore intensively.
This implies that they will face higher volatility in their performance. The model is
able to generate both the negative dependence on age (due to financial frictions) and
the negative dependence on size (due to persistence of shocks) of growth, volatility
of growth, job creation, job destruction and exit. In Albuquerque and Hopenhayn
(2004), limited liability of borrowers and limited enforcement of debt contracts imply
that it is optimal for lenders to introduce credit constraints, which can only be loos-
ened as the firm gets older and more profitable. This credit constraint implies higher
growth among young and smaller firms.
To our knowledge, this is the first work that suggests adjustment costs as an
explanation for differences in firm dynamics by age. The paper by Cabral (1995)
is nearest to this chapter. In his model, firms must pay a proportional sunk cost to
increase their production capacity. He argues that, in a model with Bayesian learning,
a proportional capacity cost would make small entering firms grow faster than large
entering firms. The reason is that small entrants are those whose initial profitability
signals were not good, so their exit probabilities are higher, and therefore they choose
to invest more gradually. Unlike our model, Cabral’s model depends on the existence
of selection. Also, by analyzing a size-growth relationship, his model is not able to
explain why some large entering firms also grow substantially.
Previous studies on linear and nonconvex adjustment costs have concluded that
their effects on average labor demand and the firm size distribution are negligible.
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Bentolila and Bertola (1990) study the effects of linear firing and hiring costs on
average labor demand and the dynamics of labor adjustment. They conclude that
high firing costs do not have a significant effect on average labor demand, but make
adjustments more sluggish. Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) analyze the effects of
a tax on job destruction on employment, productivity and welfare. They conclude
that such a tax would significantly reduce employment, productivity and welfare, but
would have insignificant effects on the size distribution of firms.
The chapter is organized as follows. In section 2.2, we present evidence of firm
dynamics for a cohort of entering firms. In section 2.3, we build the general model,
obtain optimality conditions, and provide heuristic arguments explaining the effects of
adjustment costs. In section 2.4, we analytically prove the main results in a simplified
version of the model. In section 2.5, we calibrate a finite learning horizon version and
quantify the contribution of adjustment costs to firm dynamics. Section 2.6 concludes
with plans for future research. All proofs are left for an appendix.
2.2 Firm Dynamics in a Cohort of Entering Firms
There is a well established literature on the identification and explanation of dif-
ferences in behavior between young and old firms. In this section, we analyze firm
dynamics in a cohort of entering firms. We use Quadros de Pessoal, a database
containing information on all Portuguese firms with paid employees. This dataset
originates from a mandatory annual survey run by the Ministry of Employment,
which collects information about the firm, its establishments and its workers. All
economic sectors except public administration are included. The panel we have ac-
cess to covers the period 1985-2000. Information refers to March through 1993, and
to October since the reformulation of the survey in 1994. On average the dataset
contains 250,000 firms, 300,000 establishments, and 2,500,000 workers in each year.
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The literature on firm dynamics typically finds that young firms grow faster than
old firms. Using kernel density estimates of the firm size distribution in a cohort
of entrants, Cabral and Mata (2003) argue graphically that the cohort’s evolution
is mostly due to growth of survivors rather than exit of small firms. Their analysis
points to the need for a measure of the contribution of survivors versus nonsurvivors
to the growth in a given cohort’s average size. To accomplish this, we propose a
decomposition of the cohort’s cumulative growth that will later allow an assessment of







































where τ is the firm’s age, li,τ = ln (Li,τ ) is log-employment at firm i in period τ , Sτ
is the set of age-τ surviving firms, Dτ is the set of age-τ non-surviving firms, so that
{Sτ ,Dτ} is a partition of S0, and N (X) is the number of firms in set X.4
In general, the growth in a cohort’s average size can originate from significant
growth of survivors or from smaller initial size of nonsurvivors. Any theory of firm
dynamics should consider both these sources of growth. Our measure enables us to
see if a particular theory can explain the key source of growth in a cohort’s average
size. The survivor component compares the current average size of period τ survivors
with their initial average size, so that it measures how much survivors have grown.
The selection component compares the average initial size of period τ nonsurvivors
with the average initial size of period τ survivors, so that it measures how relatively
small nonsurvivors were initially.
4Throughout the paper we will assume that firms enter in some generic period 0. Therefore, τ
will represent both the firm’s age and the period (after entry) we are analyzing.
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We can obtain a similar decomposition for employment-weighted moments. The
weighted decomposition contains information about the entire distribution of employ-
ment, not just its cross-sectional mean, and is affected both by within- and between-
firm growth. Therefore, the weighted decomposition would be more relevant for as-
sessing a richer model that considers the reallocation of employment shares between
firms within the cohort. In the results that follow we focus on the unweighted de-
composition because it analyzes within-firm growth, which in our model is the most
relevant statistic to assess the effect of adjustment costs on the incentives for firms
to grow.5
We can also produce a decomposition based on the cohort’s annual growth instead
of the cohort’s cumulative growth. However, the annual version of the above decom-
position is more sensitive to two aspects that would complicate the analysis in the
paper. First, the annual survivor component is significantly affected by the business
cycle, especially after the first few years of life. To control for this, we would need to
somehow remove the cyclical part of the survivor component. Second, as the age of
the cohort increases, the annual survivor component becomes increasingly sensitive
to downsizing and exit by some survivors that become technologically outdated and
consequently relatively less efficient. To fully consider this aspect of the data would
force us to introduce additional parameters into the model that we present in section
2.3. Therefore, we believe that by employing a decomposition based on the cohort’s
cumulative growth we avoid having to adjust the analysis for these two aspects, and
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(li,τ − li,0) .
The first term is a within-firm component, measuring average growth weighted by initial size; the
second term is a between-firm component, measuring the contribution of changes in employment
shares; and the third is a cross component. For the unweighted decomposition, the last two terms
are zero, since in this case ωXi,τ = N (X)
−1.
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Table 2.1: 1988 Firm Cohort: All Sectors
Year
Unweighted Weighted
CumEx AvEmp CGrEmp SurComp CumEx AvEmp CGrEmp SurComp
1988 1.11 2.58
1989 17.2 1.29 17.3 69.5 14.5 2.80 21.3 106.0
1990 27.7 1.38 27.1 70.4 22.5 2.99 40.9 87.9
1991 34.7 1.45 33.2 69.7 28.5 3.03 45.0 87.5
1992 39.3 1.47 35.9 69.3 33.1 3.11 52.9 89.9
1993 44.1 1.48 36.1 68.9 38.9 3.10 51.4 95.3
1994 49.6 1.48 37.0 69.2 44.8 3.18 59.3 94.0
1995 52.6 1.49 37.2 68.9 47.7 3.22 64.1 93.5
1996 55.9 1.50 38.4 67.3 50.7 3.29 70.8 91.3
1997 57.5 1.52 40.6 68.6 52.0 3.42 83.2 90.3
1998 59.6 1.53 41.3 68.5 54.2 3.40 81.4 88.4
1999 61.6 1.55 43.5 69.0 56.0 3.61 102.3 88.9
Notes: CumEx is the cumulative exit rate (in %); AvEmp is the mean of log-employment
among survivors; CGrEmp is the cumulative growth rate (in %) of mean log-employment
among survivors; SurComp is the survivor component (in %) associated with the cumulative
change in AvEmp.
instead focus on how intense is survivor’s growth while learning-about-efficiency ef-
fects are significant.
In table 2.1, we present the evolution of exit rates and the share of firm growth
due to the survivor component in the 1988 cohort of entering firms for the overall
economy.6 In 1988 there were 22, 810 entering firms. The exit rate is very high
initially but tends to decrease as firms get older.7 However, ten years after entry
6We identify entering firms in year t as those firms that have not been in the database before
t. Given the high incidence of temporarily missing firms, we select the 1988 entering cohort, using
1985 and 1986 to detect false entries. Similarly, we identify exiting firms in the τ -th period (after
entry in 1988) as those firms that are present in the database in period τ − 1, but do not reappear
in any of the following periods. Therefore, we display results only up to 1999, using 2000 to detect
false exits. This procedure eliminates most false entries and false exits.
7To avoid inconsistent sets of firms at period τ and period 0, we adopt the following procedure
concerning temporarily missing firms. In measuring exit and growth between period 0 and period τ ,
we consider only the set of nonmissing firms in period τ . Across all years, this procedure excludes
a maximum of 11.7% of all entering firms. We do not exclude all firms which ever had temporarily
missing values during their lifetime, because that would eliminate too many firms (about 1/3 of the
entering cohort). Therefore, the exit rate among all firms, including temporarily missing firms, is
slightly smaller than that reported in table 2.1: 15.6% in 1989, 40% in 1993, and 59.9% in 1999. We
also analyzed the effect of excluding temporarily missing survivors only until 1993. In this case, we
exclude around 1/5 of all entering firms and the implied exit rates are 19.9% in 1989 and 46.5% in
1993, but the survivor component becomes slightly higher. The same would occur if we had used
the 1991 cohort instead. Finally, in 1994 there is a higher than normal exit rate because the survey
moved from March to October in this year. A corrected annual cumulative exit rate for 1994 would
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Table 2.2: 1988 Firm Cohort: Summary Characteristics by Sector
Sector
EmpSh CumEx AvEmp CGrEmp SurComp SurCompw
88 89 92 99 88 89 92 99 89-99 89-99
All 100.0 17.2 39.3 61.6 1.11 17.3 35.9 43.5 69.0 92.1
Manu 41.8 15.7 39.2 61.7 1.58 19.7 40.7 46.1 83.3 113.9
Serv 20.1 18.9 41.0 60.9 0.99 12.7 32.2 40.6 61.6 77.8
Reta 11.1 16.3 37.6 60.8 0.80 15.2 32.5 43.0 69.7 92.1
Cons 10.5 16.1 37.9 59.5 1.32 17.9 32.7 36.9 67.1 88.2
Whol 6.7 14.3 34.6 62.5 1.16 24.2 47.1 60.6 79.2 78.6
Notes: EmpSh is the employment share of the sector in the cohort (in %); CumEx is
the cumulative exit rate (in %); AvEmp is the mean of log-employment among survivors;
CGrEmp is the cumulative growth rate (in %) of mean log-employment among survivors;
SurComp and SurCompw are the survivor component (in %) associated with the cumulative
change in AvEmp, based on unweighted and employment weighted moments, respectively.
only 40% of the initial entrants remain active. There is significant growth in the
cohort’s average size, which is mostly due to the growth of survivors rather than to the
exit of small inefficient firms. For the unweighted decomposition, survivors’ growth
contributes around 69% to the growth in the cohort’s average size. The employment-
weighted results show that larger firms have smaller exit rates, and therefore average
employment increases more intensely. This, and the fact that high growth firms
increase their weight over time, explains the larger shares for the survivor component.8
Table 2.2 presents similar evidence on cohort dynamics at roughly the one-digit
sectoral level.9 We include the employment shares of each sector in the 1988 cohort of
entering firms, which are close to shares in the overall economy. Even though manu-
facturing has a much higher employment share than services, the number of entering
firms in services surpasses that of manufacturing (6074 and 4834, respectively). All
sectors display a cumulative exit rate around 61% by 1999. However, initial differences
in exit rates are more significant, with manufacturing and wholesale trade displaying
be around 47.8%.
8A similar exercise for labor productivity revealed that survivors account for about 90% of the
change in the cohort’s unweighted average productivity.
9In order to obtain equivalent one-digit SIC87 sectors, we use the following correspondence
in terms of CAE Rev. 1 codes : construction(= 5), manufacturing(= 3), wholesale trade(= 6.1),
retail trade(= 6.2), and services(= 6.3 + 8.3.2 + 8.3.3 + 9.2 + 9.3 + 9.4 + 9.5). We omit agriculture,
finance, mining, and transportation and public utilities because of the small entering cohorts.
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the smallest values, and services displaying the highest value. In terms of initial size,
manufacturing has the largest entrants, and services and retail trade the smallest.
Although manufacturing and wholesale trade have the largest entrants, they exhibit
more growth in average employment and a larger contribution of survivors to that
growth than services and retail trade.
We perform two robustness checks on the previous findings. First, we redo our cal-
culations using establishments rather than firms as the unit of analysis. For the 1988
establishment cohort, we obtain similar results, although exit rates and the survivor
component are higher than in the case of firms. Second, we examine an alternative
cohort to make sure our results are not driven by business cycle conditions. The
Portuguese economy experienced an expansion between 1986 and 1991, a recession
between 1992 and 1994, and another weaker expansion between 1995 and 2000. The
growth rates of real GDP were 6.4% in 1989, 1.1% in 1992, and 4.3% in 1995, so that
the 1991 cohort did not face as favorable a macroeconomic environment as the 1988
cohort. However, the results for the 1991 cohort are, in all dimensions, very similar
to those presented above. The results for the 1994 cohort are also very similar, but
with slightly smaller values for the survivor component in the first few years after
entry.10
Two symptoms of linear and nonconvex costs are inaction and lumpiness in labor
adjustment. Lumpiness is typically taken as evidence of fixed adjustment costs, while
inaction is associated with both proportional and fixed adjustment costs. In table 2.3,
we provide evidence on both of these phenomena in the 1988 cohort of entering firms.
We use the unweighted and the employment-weighted distributions of the adjusted
growth rate conditional on survival. Following Davis and Haltiwanger (1992), the
10Reflecting our previous argument about the greater cyclical sensitivity of the decomposition
based on the cohort’s annual growth rate, we observe a substantial reduction in the annual survivor
component associated with the 1988 and 1991 cohorts during the 1992-1994 recession. However, a
similar pattern does not occur with the 1994 cohort. This is one of the reasons why we choose a
decomposition based on cumulative growth rates. Note also that the annual selection component is
not as sensitive to the business cycle as the annual survivor component.
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Table 2.3: 1988 Firm Cohort: Characteristics of Labor Adjustment by Sector
Sector
Unweighted Weighted
89 93 89 93
N30 NA P30 N30 NA P30 N30 NA P30 N30 NA P30
All 7.9 43.0 13.7 13.7 45.3 17.1 18.0 19.1 27.3 30.3 21.0 30.6
Manu 10.8 31.5 20.7 20.9 33.4 24.6 20.2 11.6 33.3 38.6 15.6 33.9
Serv 7.3 47.7 11.8 11.3 50.3 15.0 19.5 25.6 22.4 22.5 24.9 31.0
Reta 4.7 55.5 9.1 8.2 55.8 12.7 9.8 40.5 17.1 16.4 36.3 27.5
Cons 10.5 31.4 13.9 17.5 34.3 17.1 15.5 14.0 22.2 31.8 16.9 25.0
Whol 8.1 35.8 17.5 12.6 42.1 21.5 14.0 21.3 31.0 23.9 24.5 28.0
Notes: N30 is the fraction of firms with an adjusted growth rate of employment, conditional
on survival, in the interval (-30%,0%); NA is the fraction of firms that do not adjust
employment, conditional on survival; P30 is the fraction of firms with an adjusted growth
rate of employment, conditional on survival, in the interval (0%,30%). All values in %.
adjusted growth rate in period τ is defined as 100× (Lτ − Lτ−1) /L̃τ−1, where L̃τ−1 =
1
2
(Lτ + Lτ−1). This L̃τ−1 is also used to define employment weights. The table
shows that the incidence of inaction is very high, increases with age, and is higher in
sectors with smaller firms like services or retail trade. This may be due to technology-
induced differences in adjustment costs, or due to indivisibilities in jobs, or due to a
smaller impact of fixed adjustment costs for larger firms. An additional fact is the
left skewness of the 1989 distributions, showing that survivors tend to grow initially,
especially in manufacturing and wholesale trade. This skewness is less evident in 1993
(especially in the weighted data), suggesting that adjustment patterns are different
in initial years.
This evidence on inaction and lumpiness justifies our assumption of linear and
nonconvex adjustment costs in the model that we present next.
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2.3 A Model of Learning with Linear and Noncon-
vex Costs
In this section, we introduce linear and nonconvex adjustment costs into a model of
Bayesian learning about efficiency. We derive conditions for optimal employment over
time and present heuristic findings about the effects of adjustment costs on the path
of employment. Our model is similar to Jovanovic (1982), although we change the
way the idiosyncratic shock is specified and add adjustment costs.
We assume an industry with competitive output and input markets. Current
profits of a representative firm are defined by
Π (L, θ) = pF (L) θ − wL,
where F (L) θ is the production function; L is the amount of labor input; θ is a pro-
ductivity shock; p is the output price; and w is the wage rate. Given the competitive
environment, the firm considers both p and w as known constants.
Concerning technology we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1 The two components of the production function satisfy:
(a) F : R+ → R+ is C2, F 0 > 0, F 00 < 0, F (0) = 0, F 0 (0+) =∞, and F 0 (∞) = 0.
(b) Letting τ denote the firm’s age and 0 the period in which the firm enters, the
stochastic process of θ is defined by














where μ0, μ1, {ετ}τ≥0 are mutually independent, ξ : R → R+ is C1, ξ0 > 0 and
ξ (−∞) = ν1 ≥ 0, ξ (∞) = ν2 <∞.
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Part (a) basically ensures a well defined interior optimum. In some of the analyses
below, we will further specialize by assuming that F is Cobb-Douglas. Meanwhile,
part (b) establishes that in each period productivity is stochastic with a constant
mean over the firm’s lifetime. The long-run productivity coefficient, μ, has two com-
ponents: μ0, which is observed at entry but prior to the initial choice of employment,
and μ1, which is never directly observed by the firm. The introduction of μ0 is es-
sential to obtain a non-degenerate initial distribution of size in the cohort of entering
firms. Intuitively, μ0 can be thought of as indexing ex ante efficiency, measuring such
aspects as initial research and technology choice, while μ1 indexes ex post productiv-
ity, measuring how well a firm performs within its technology choice.
The introduction of μ0 is essential to our posterior analysis of the survivors’ con-
tribution to growth in the cohort’s average size. In Jovanovic (1982) there is only
one component to the productivity parameter, so that the distribution of initial size
is degenerate. In this case, all future nonsurvivors will have the same average initial
size as all future survivors, so that our measure of the survivors’ component would
be 100%. By assuming σμ0 > 0, we avoid this aspect of Jovanovic’s model.
At entry the firm knows the parameters governing the stochastic process of θ, i.e.,
μ̄, σ2μ0 , σ
2
μ1
and σ2, and the realization of ex ante productivity μ0. Over time, the
firm will learn about its specific μ1 by observing the realizations of θτ . To form a
prediction for its productivity, in each period the firm forms a posterior estimate for
μ based on past realizations of productivity, {θs}τ−1s=0 , and on the ex ante efficiency
parameter μ0. Similarly to Zellner (1971), a firm with age τ ≥ 0 has the following
Bayesian posterior distribution for μ at the beginning of period τ :





















In lemma 2 of appendix A.1 we show that, for purposes of predicting μ, Ωτ can be
summarized by (θ∗τ , τ), where θ
∗
τ is the prediction of the productivity coefficient at τ
based on the information available at the beginning of period τ . That is, θ∗τ = Eτ (θτ)
where Eτ (·) ≡ E (· | Ωτ) is the conditional expectation given the information set at
τ .
We now lay out the timing assumptions.
Assumption 3 A potential entering firm, at the beginning of period 0, takes the fol-
lowing actions:
(i.a) Fixed cost and ex ante productivity: the firm pays a fixed cost I > 0, associated
with the process of initial research, after which it observes its realization of ex ante
productivity, μ0.
(i.b) Entry decision: based on the idiosyncratic realization of μ0, the firm chooses
whether to enter the industry or not.
(i.c) Initial employment and production decisions: conditional on entering the in-
dustry, the firm chooses how much labor to use and how much output to produce in
period 0.
A firm of age τ > 0 takes the following actions:
(ii.a) Update of posterior productivity: at the beginning of period τ , the firm updates
its posterior expectation of θτ , θ
∗





end of period τ − 1.
(ii.b) Exit decision: given the new posterior productivity estimate, θ∗τ , and employ-
ment from last period, Lτ−1, the firm chooses whether to stay or exit the industry.
(ii.c) Employment and production decisions: conditional on staying, the firm chooses
how much labor to use and how much output to produce in the current period. At the
end of period τ , the firm observes the productivity realization, θτ , and the process
repeats itself again until the firm decides to leave the industry.11
11In this model we do not consider the possibility that as firms get older they might decay or
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While deciding whether to stay one more period or to exit, the firm compares
the expected profit in case it stays, V , with the opportunity cost of doing so, W .
In a model where the capital decision is explicitly considered, this opportunity cost
could be defined as the expected profit of applying the firm’s capital resources in an
alternative activity. Therefore, in the absence of adjustment costs we have:
V (θ∗τ , τ) = max
Lτ
©








θ∗τ+1, τ + 1
¢ª¤ª
(2.3)
where V represents expected profits conditional on staying in period τ .
At entry, we have Ω0 ≡ μ0, and in equilibrium expected profits net of the fixed





Since markets are competitive and there is no friction in the entry and exit processes,
the assumption of a strictly positive initial fixed cost, I > 0, is essential to avoid the
extreme situation where entry and exit are so high that only the highest productivity
firms would enter and remain in the industry. Although I enables us to obtain a non-
degenerate initial distribution of size, we do not explicitly consider a capital stock
decision. The main reason for not including capital in the model is that there is no
reliable capital stock variable in Quadros de Pessoal.
Up to this point, the only differences between our model and Jovanovic (1982)
are that in the latter model the efficiency parameter implicitly affects the cost func-
tion and the initial distribution of productivity in the entering cohort is degenerate.
Therefore, without adjustment costs there would be no intertemporal linkages in our
model aside from the exit decision. Because V is strictly increasing in θ∗, the exit
decision is characterized by an age-dependent exit threshold. For values of θ∗τ above
or equal to that threshold, the firm would stay and choose employment to maximize
current period profits. For values of θ∗τ below that threshold, the firm would leave the
become obsolete. This could be achieved by assuming exogenous probabilities for those two events.
This could generate both a decrease in size of old firms (decay) and the exit of old firms (decay and
obsolescence).
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industry, since its expected profitability is below the opportunity cost. The increas-
ing confidence the firm puts in θ∗τ as it grows older implies that the exit threshold is
increasing with age. This is the driving force underlying Jovanovic’s result that the
size distribution and the survival probability increase with age.
We now introduce linear and nonconvex costs into the model, allowing entry and
exit costs to differ from regular adjustment costs. The adjustment cost function for
continuing firms, CS : R2+ → R+, is defined as
CS (Lτ , Lτ−1) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
CSU = F SU + P SU (Lτ − Lτ−1) , if Lτ > Lτ−1,
CSN = 0, if Lτ = Lτ−1,
CSD = F SD + P SD (Lτ−1 − Lτ) , if Lτ < Lτ−1,
where the superscript indexes S, SD, SN , and SU stand for “staying”, “staying and
adjusting downwards”, “staying and not adjusting”, and “staying and adjusting up-
wards”. Therefore, FSU ≥ 0, P SU ≥ 0 are the fixed and proportional hiring costs,
and FSD ≥ 0, P SD ≥ 0 are the fixed and proportional firing costs, respectively. The
entry and exit (adjustment) cost functions, CEN : R+ → R+ and CEX : R+ → R+,
respectively, are defined as
CEN (L0) = F
EN + PENL0,
CEX (Lτ) = F
EX + PEXLτ ,
where the superscript indexes EN and EX stand for “entering” and “exiting” the
industry, respectively. Then, FEN ≥ 0, PEN ≥ 0 are the fixed and proportional entry
costs, and FEX ≥ 0, PEX ≥ 0 are the fixed and proportional exit costs, respectively.
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With entry, adjustment and exit costs, the optimization problem now becomes,
V S (Lτ−1, θ
∗
τ , τ) = max
Lτ
©£
Π (Lτ , θ
∗












τ+1, τ + 1
¢ª¤ª
, (2.4)
for all periods after entry (τ ≥ 1) in which the firm remains in the industry, and


















for the entry period, where V EX , the value of exiting, is defined as
V EX (Lτ) =W − CEX (Lτ) .
Note that contrary to the case without adjustment costs, the previous period employ-
ment is a state variable for the current period optimization problem. Also, in V EN
and in V EX the costs of entry and exit are taken into account.
In general, we can allow for asymmetry among the cost parameters in CS, CEN ,
and CEX . However, asymmetries between exit and firing costs or between entry and
hiring costs lead to biases in entry and exit decisions. For example, if hiring pro-
portional costs are higher than entry proportional costs, then firms will tend to hire
more workers at entry in order to save on expected future hiring costs; if firing propor-
tional costs are smaller than exit proportional costs, then firms facing the prospect of
exit will tend to decrease their employment right before exiting the industry. There-
fore, in what follows we will consider the standard case to be FEN = F SU = FH ,
PEN = P SU = PH , FEX = FSD = FF , and PEX = P SD = PF , where the super-
script indexes H , F stand for “hiring” and “firing”. We will comment on the effects
of asymmetries when relevant.
Because the adjustment cost function introduces a nondifferentiability and dis-
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continuity of the objective function at the frontiers between adjustment and non-
adjustment, some of the usual properties assumed for the value function do not hold
in general, and some proofs of its properties must be adapted. We briefly discuss here
how we tackle the problem and leave proofs for the appendix. We consider a two-step
optimization procedure where the firm first chooses optimal employment in each of
three possible scenarios, and then selects the scenario with the highest pay-off. More
precisely,
V S (·) = max
©
V SD (·) , V SN (·) , V SU (·)
ª
,
where V SD and V SU are obtained by maximizing the objective function in (2.4) over
Lτ ≤ Lτ−1 (with CS replaced by CSD) and Lτ ≥ Lτ−1 (with CS replaced by CSU),
respectively, and V SN is obtained by choosing Lτ = Lτ−1 in (2.4).
In proposition 4 we present some properties of the value function V S and its
associated optimal exit policy function.
Proposition 4 Let V S be defined as in (2.4). Then:
(a) There exists a unique value function V S (Lτ−1, θ∗τ , τ) satisfying (2.4) that is
bounded, continuous in (Lτ−1, θ∗τ), and strictly increasing in θ
∗
τ .
(b) There exists a unique optimal exit policy function χ∗τ (Lτ−1, θ
∗





, where θEX (Lτ−1, τ) is a unique continuous function in Lτ−1.
Proof. See appendix A.1.
Because V S is not concave, at least when fixed costs are positive, we cannot prove
the usual differentiability properties of the value function. Therefore, in what follows,




τ+1, τ + 1
¢
is differentiable at Lτ with probability
one, in terms of F
¡
θ∗τ+1 | θ∗τ , τ
¢
for all θ∗τ ∈ Θ. By part (b) of proposition 4 and
the dominated convergence theorem, this implies that the objective functions associ-
ated with V SD, V SN and V SU are continuously differentiable in L, so that marginal
conditions can be applied to find interior optima. This assumption also implies that
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V S (Lτ−1, θ
∗
τ , τ) is differentiable at Lτ−1 with probability one.
12 In general, the op-
timal employment will not be characterized by a simple target and threshold policy
due to the presence of fixed adjustment costs.13
We have the following proposition concerning the optimal employment policy.
Proposition 6 For any period τ > 0, if the firm adjusts upwards, optimal employ-
ment satisfies
[pF 0 (L∗τ) θ
∗


















= P SU ,
(2.6)
and we must have V SU > V SN , whereas if the firm adjusts downwards optimal em-
ployment satisfies
[pF 0 (L∗τ ) θ
∗




















and we must have V SD > V SN .




− I ≥ W , in which case
optimal employment satisfies
[pF 0 (L∗0) θ
∗















= PEN . (2.8)




τ+s are functions of the
optimal exit decision, χ∗τ+j, in periods τ +1 to τ + s, such that χ̃
∗
τ+s equals one when
the firm has remained in the industry until period τ + s − 1, but decides to exit in
12In proposition 5 of appendix A.1, we prove that this property holds both in a model with a
finite lifetime horizon and in a model with infinite-lived firms that face a finite learning horizon (as
in sections 2.4 and 2.5).
13A simple policy is composed of two thresholds and two targets, i.e., (t, T, U, u), where if L < t,
then L0 = T , while if L > u, then L0 = U , and L0 = L otherwise. In the case with fixed costs,
even in the simpler problems of Chen and Simchi-Levi (2003) and Ye and Duenyas (2006), it is still
unknown what property of the value function ensures that the optimal employment policy will be a
simple policy. Some concept similar to that of (K1,K2)-concavity might be useful here.
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period τ +s, and χ̂∗τ+s equals one when the firm is still in the industry in period τ +s.
Proof. See appendix A.1.
Equations (2.6), (2.7) and (2.8) are marginal conditions, similar to the smooth
pasting conditions in the (S,s) model literature, and they state that if the firm adjusts
then the marginal adjustment cost must equal the expected present discounted value
of the marginal revenue product for all future periods in which the firm is still in the
industry, minus the increase in the exit cost when the firm decides to exit. This is
the discrete-time analog of the continuous-time result present in Nickell (1986) and
Bentolila and Bertola (1990), adjusted for the fact that now we also have an exit
decision in each period. The firm will not adjust if the marginal cost of adjustment
exceeds its marginal benefit for the first unit of adjustment. The conditions involving
V SD, V SN , V SU , and V EN are similar to the value matching conditions in the (S,s)
model literature, and they state that adjustment will only occur when its pay-off is
higher than non-adjustment. When there are fixed adjustment costs (contrary to
Nickell and Bentolila and Bertola), the fact that the marginal benefit of adjustment
exceeds the marginal cost of adjustment at the current employment level (Lτ−1) does
not imply that it is optimal for the firm to adjust, because the total benefit from
adjustment must also exceed the total cost of adjustment (including the fixed cost).
Therefore, proportional costs imply inaction whereas fixed costs imply both inaction
and lumpiness in the employment decisions of the firm.





W new firms will enter the industry, causing a decrease in price p until equality is
restored.
Even though the results in proposition 6 do not enable us to solve the model
analytically, and therefore prove formally the effects of adjustment costs in this gen-
eral model, the following corollary of proposition 6 will allow us to make qualitative
heuristic statements.
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Corollary 7 For any period τ ≥ 0, the marginal benefit of one additional unit of




τ , τ) = (pF
0 (L∗τ) θ
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τ+1, τ + 1
¢¤
(2.9)










τ ) are the optimal employment and
exit decisions.
Proof. See appendix A.1.
As we have seen above, when there are no costs to adjustment, optimal employ-
ment is determined solely to maximize current period profits. Therefore, firms’ growth
is essentially a by-product of a selection mechanism: those firms that are inefficient,
and therefore small, exit, while those firms that are efficient survive and grow. There
is an additional source of positive growth when the frictionless employment decision
rule is convex in θ∗. Because of Jensen’s inequality and because θ∗τ is a Martin-













However, L∗ will not be convex in θ∗ for general F (L).14
We now analyze each cost in turn, assuming symmetry both between hiring and
entry costs and between firing and exit costs. In the heuristic arguments that follow,
we use the property thatMBτ is weakly increasing in θ
∗
τ , and that L
∗
τ is locally weakly
increasing in θ∗τ . We present in figure 2.1 the case where there is a proportional hiring

























< 0, L0 (θ∗) > 0,




. Therefore, if decreasing returns to labor do not decrease too fast,












, then we will have L̄00 (θ∗) < 0. When F (L) = ln (L), then
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Figure 2.1: Proportional Hiring/Entry Cost
cost, PH > 0, and all other costs are zero. This figure assumes a given Lτ−1. For
that specific value of Lt−1, θ
SU and θSD are the frontiers between non-adjustment and





will be no adjustment. In this case there is inaction but no lumpiness in employment,
and the marginal benefit of an additional unit of labor (represented by the dashed




. To make the argument clearer, we consider
a firm whose sequence of productivity draws is such that in every period it has a
perceived productivity equal to the unconditional mean of θ∗, even though the firm’s
uncertainty over next period θ∗ decreases with age.
Case 1: Proportional Hiring Cost: PH > 0 (all other costs are zero)





, for all subsequent periods, τ = 1, 2, . . . , with the two extremes of
the interval representing firing and hiring of workers, respectively. Consider first a
situation where exit is not allowed.15 Then (2.9) would become
MB (Lτ−1, θ
∗
τ , τ) = (pF
0 (L∗τ ) θ
∗




τ+1, τ + 1
¢
15This could be obtained by assuming a sufficiently large fixed cost of exit, FEX .
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For the entry period, we have MB (θ∗0) = PH , which implies that the firm will start




, E0MB1 < PH
and thus we must have pF 0 (L0)−w > 0, for all β ∈ (0, 1), if PH > 0. In the following
period, firms will adjust upwards as frequently with PH > 0 as when PH = 0, because




0, even though they might have smaller
magnitudes of adjustment due to the hiring cost.17 The proportional hiring cost
implies that firms will adjust downwards only if θ∗1 < θ
SD
1 , so that there is a region
of inaction when PH > 0 that is not present when PH = 0. That is, firms hire fewer
workers initially because the resulting smaller probability of having to fire them, and
therefore wasting the initial hiring cost, compensates for the expected decrease in
profits this period. Consequently, in period 1 more firms will hire than fire, and this
tendency towards growth in young firms will persist for several periods.
The Bayesian learning mechanism implies both persistence and a reduction in
variance with age in the Markov process associated with θ∗τ . The effect of persistence,
that is, the fact that E
¡
θ∗τ+1 | θ∗τ , τ
¢
= θ∗τ , was analyzed in the previous paragraph.
The reduced uncertainty in the posterior estimate of productivity will be reflected
in a smaller inaction region; that is, θSU will decrease. This causes an increase in
EτMBτ+1 for those firms already at the hiring margin, which must be balanced by
an increase in L∗τ for the right hand side of (2.9) to remain equal to P
H . As firms
become more certain about their true productivity they are more willing to adjust
to their long run optimal size. Because most firms are at the hiring margin, this will
cause a further increase in average size.
Consider now the possibility of exit. In this case, the uncertainty reduction as
the firm ages implies a decrease in the exit probability, and a further increase in
the future-periods component of MB in (2.9). Consequently, L∗τ needs to increase
16When there is no exit and no fixed costs, we can prove that V S is concave (and continuously
differentiable) in L, so that L0 must decrease for MB0 to increase.
17In fact, firms should adjust upwards more frequently, since the inaction region becomes smaller
with the reduction in uncertainty over next period productivity as firms get older.
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further in order to compensate.18 On the other hand, the smaller exit probability
makes selection less intense as a cohort ages, which tends to make growth in average
firm size smaller. This occurs because there is less pruning of inefficient slow-growing
firms. Therefore, we will have less growth due to selection and more growth due to
survivors, so that survivors’ contribution to average firm growth should increase when
exit is allowed.19
Case 2: Proportional Firing Cost: PF > 0 (all other costs are zero)




, τ = 1, 2, . . . . Assume first that exit
is not allowed. The intuition is the same as in case 1. In comparison with PF = 0,
when PF > 0 firms start smaller and subsequently hire more frequently than they fire.
As firms age, the reduction in variance of θ∗ causes an increase in EτMBτ+1, which
must be compensated by an increase in L∗τ for firms at the hiring margin. When exit
is possible, those effects become more intense, since the exit probability will decrease
as firms age.
Case 3: Fixed Hiring Cost: FH > 0 (all other costs are zero)
Contrary to above, nowMB0 = 0 at entry and MBτ ≥ 0, τ = 1, 2, . . . , with equality
whenever the firm adjusts in either direction. When FH > 0, the firm will only hire
if the total benefit of hiring exceeds the fixed cost. This implies that even if MBτ
is positive, the firm might not hire in future periods because the total benefit does
not compensate for FH . Thus, hiring fixed costs cause an increase in equilibrium
price and entry size, and a reduced frequency of hiring in the following periods.20
Firms realize that they will be less willing to adjust upwards next period because of
18This effect is similar to that of Cabral (1995).
19There is an additional effect of adjustment costs that is due to the increase in price. This
change in equilibrium price affects the level of average size, but has a second order impact on the
growth rate of average size.
20This is related to the point made by Jovanovic and Stolyarov (2000), in the sense that a fixed
capacity formation cost and proportional adjustment costs for labor would be a good explanation
for both the initial high excess capacity of firms and the reduction in excess capacity with age, as
firms increase the relative use of labor.
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the fixed cost. Therefore, reduced profits from overhiring at entry are compensated
by smaller expected future hiring costs and higher profits in case of non-adjustment.
Only firms that experience a sufficiently high increase in productivity will increase
employment in the future, and they will do so by the same magnitude as in the case
with no fixed cost. Meanwhile, all firms that receive a bad signal will reduce their
size. Fixed hiring costs will thus create an incentive for firms to start large and to
grow slowly thereafter.
Contrary to previous cases, reduced uncertainty in θ∗ causes a decrease inEτMBτ+1
since it produces a decrease in θSU , while entering firms are located at θSD. Therefore,
L∗τ will tend to decrease with age as firms realize that indeed they have overhired.
However, the decrease in the probability of exit will have an effect similar to that in
the previous cases, causing an increase in the future-periods component ofMBτ , and
creating an incentive for growth as firms survive.
Case 4: Fixed Firing Cost: FF > 0 (all other costs are zero)
Here we have MB0 = 0 at entry and MBτ ≤ 0, τ = 1, 2, . . . , with equality whenever
the firm adjusts. Assume first there is no exit. Firms will be more willing to adjust
upwards than downwards. Therefore, a firing fixed cost will cause an increase in
equilibrium price, a decrease in entry size, and a reduced frequency of firing in the
following periods. The reduced uncertainty in θ∗ as firms age causes an increase in
θSD, and an increase in EτMBτ+1 since entering firms are located at θ
SU . Therefore,
there will be a tendency for employment to increase, as firms realize a reduction in the
probability of future overemployment. Consider now the effect of exit. Once again,
a reduction in the probability of exit will cause an increase in the future-periods
component of MBτ , so that optimal current employment must increase to maintain
equality in (2.9).
The heuristic intuition we have given above analyzes each cost in isolation. When
we have more than one of those costs simultaneously, with possible asymmetries
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between hiring and firing, the results will be a mix of the effects presented. Note that
proportional hiring and proportional firing costs reinforce each other, whereas fixed
hiring and fixed firing costs counteract each other. If fixed costs are more important
for capital and proportional costs are more important for labor, we could explain why
firms tend to have initial excess capacity, why capital adjustments tend to be lumpier
and more intermittent than labor adjustments, and why firm employment size tends
to grow with age.
Our heuristic analysis suggests that most forms of (labor) adjustment costs create
incentives for growth. In the end, our assessment of the relevance of adjustment costs
will depend on how well a pure selection model can fit the empirical evidence, and on
how well adjustment costs can improve the fit. Before we move into a quantitative
assessment, we present analytical results for a simple version of the general model.
2.4 Model with One Period Learning Horizon and
No Exit
In this section, we analyze a model where firms learn their true efficiency after the first
period of life. The introduction of adjustment costs implies an additional expected
operating cost for entering firms. Therefore, the equilibrium price must increase to
generate higher expected future profits that compensate for the costs incurred while
adjusting to optimal size. These higher profits translate into less selection, so that
more inefficient firms will be able to survive. In fact, this is optimal from a social
point of view, since there will be some saving in unrecoverable costs.
In order to investigate the implications of firms’ lifetime horizon, we assume that
firms live for T̄ periods, T̄ ∈ {2, . . . ,∞}. We also assume that no exit is allowed prior
to age T̄ . Therefore, we eliminate any selection and focus only on the incentives for
survivors to grow. We know that adjustment costs decrease the amount of selection
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in the industry, so that if adjustment costs create incentives for survivors to grow
faster, then we would have a higher relative contribution of survivors to growth in
the cohort’s average size even if we allowed exit. We examine the impact of adjustment
costs on the log growth rate of employment rather than the standard growth rate, in
order to attenuate the effect of Jensen’s inequality on firm growth.21
To formulate the problem, we use the fact that once the firm learns its true
efficiency in period 2, it will adjust once and for all to its long run employment
level, and not adjust in any of the following periods. This result is formalized in
proposition 11 below. Therefore, assuming that upon exit at age T̄ the firm receives
its opportunity cost net of exit costs, the optimization problem in period 2 is
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above. In period 1, we then have
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Finally, the equilibrium price is determined by the condition that potential entrants




− I =W .
A common implication of proportional and fixed costs is the existence of an in-
action region which is a function of previous period employment and the adjustment





. Therefore, the average log growth rate between period 1
21As we saw above, Jensen’s inequality implies positive expected growth, even in the absence of
adjustment costs, when optimal employment is a convex function of θ∗. Because the log transforma-
tion is concave, it will counteract the convexity of the optimal employment function. For example,
for a Cobb-Douglas specification of F (·), using a log growth rate will eliminate the effect of Jensen’s




and period 2, conditional on θ∗1, is defined as
g (θ∗1) = E [ln (L
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dF (θ∗2 | θ∗1)
where Θ ≡ [ν1, ν2] is the support of the distribution of θ∗2, and θSD (L∗1) and θSU (L∗1)
are the frontiers between non-adjustment and downward and upward adjustment, re-
spectively. Depending on the specific value of θ∗1 and the magnitude of the adjustment
cost parameters, we might have θSD (L∗1) = ν1 and/or θ
SU (L∗1) = ν2. However, in the
results that follow, we assume that θ∗1 and the adjustment cost parameters are such
that both downward adjustment and upward adjustment occur with positive proba-
bility, i.e., θSD (L∗1) > ν1 and θ
SU (L∗1) < ν2. While analyzing the effect of each type
of adjustment cost, we assume the other costs to be zero, but the sign of the partial
effects would not change if we allowed other costs to be present. We also ignore the
indirect effects of adjustment costs due to changes in the equilibrium price. These
indirect price effects influence average firm size in both periods, but are of second
order importance for the average log growth rate.22 We first consider proportional
costs and then fixed costs.
Case 1: Proportional Costs: either PF > 0 or PH > 0.
















, θ∗2 > θ
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L∗SN2 = L1, θ
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22In the proof of proposition 8 below, we show for proportional adjustment costs that if the
production function is Cobb-Douglas then the indirect price effects cancel out.
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Note that the numerator of θSU equals the pro-rated per-period cost of adding another
worker, including the wage, the marginal hiring cost, and the discounted cost of firing
the worker after period T̄ . The numerator of θSD has a similar interpretation, as the
benefit of shedding a worker.
We then have the following result concerning the effects of changes in PH and PF
on the cohort’s average log growth rate of employment.
Proposition 8 23Assuming that F (L) is Cobb-Douglas and that θSD (L∗1) > ν1 and
θSU (L∗1) < ν2:
(a) The marginal effect of PH on g (θ∗1), assuming all other costs are zero, is positive
for a high enough value of T̄ .
(b) The marginal effect of PF on g (θ∗1), assuming all other costs are zero, is positive
for all T̄ .
Proof. See appendix A.1.
Consider first the hiring cost. In the proof, we show that an increase in PH
decreases both L∗1 and L
∗SU
2 . The impact of P
H on the growth rate depends on two
opposing effects. First, while in the case of L∗SU2 the cost of hiring can be equally
spread out over T̄ − 1 periods with certainty, in the case of L∗1 it will be spread out
over either T̄ periods or one period, depending on whether the firm learns in period
2 that it has overhired. Therefore, ex ante a proportionately greater part of PH is
attached to period 1 in the case of L∗1. This explains the positive effect on growth
23In the proof, we consider a general production function and then specialize to a Cobb-Douglas
specification in order to obtain the sign of the effect. From that general setup, we can say that the
form of the production function should not be determinant for these results when the elasticity of
the marginal product of labor does not change much with the amount of labor used.
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of PH for T̄ = ∞. Second, the hiring cost on L∗1 can possibly be spread out over T̄
periods, while the hiring cost on L∗SU2 can only be spread out over T̄ − 1 periods.
This explains why the effect of PH on growth is not necessarily positive for finite T̄ .
However, as T̄ increases the first effect dominates so that PH decreases L∗1 more than
L∗SU2 and growth increases.
24
With respect to PF there is always a positive effect on growth, independently of
the lifetime horizon. This occurs because an increase in PF decreases L∗1 and increases
L∗SD2 . This positive effect always dominates the uncertain effect due to the fact that
L∗SU2 also decreases with P
F .
When there are both hiring and firing costs and these costs are identical (PH =
PF = P ), then an increase in P has a positive effect on g (θ∗1), for sufficiently high T̄ ,
where the required T̄ is lower than in item (a) of proposition 8.
Case 2: Fixed Costs: either FF > 0 or FH > 0.
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where V SD, V SN , and V SU have an analogous definition to that in the general model
of the previous section.
The following proposition summarizes the effects of FH and FF on g (θ∗1).
24In our simulations, T̄ = 3 was enough to generate a positive effect on growth.
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Proposition 9 For a general production function, under the assumption that θSD (L∗1)
> ν1 and θ
SU (L∗1) < ν2:
(a) The marginal effect of FH on g (θ∗1), assuming all other costs are zero, is negative
for all T̄ .
(b) The marginal effect of FF on g (θ∗1), assuming all other costs are zero, is positive
for all T̄ .
Proof. See appendix A.1.
Excluding the indirect effect of prices, the intuition is clear. With a fixed hiring
cost, firms know that they will be less willing to adjust upwards; that is, ∂θSU/∂FH >
0. The consequence of this is that they hire more initially, ∂L∗1/∂F
H > 0. Because
optimal employment in period 2, conditional on adjustment, is not affected directly
by FH , then we must have a smaller average growth. A similar inverse logic applies
to the fixed firing cost.
In the results above we have assumed symmetry both between hiring and entry
costs and between firing and exit costs. This assumption is innocuous for fixed costs,
since fixed entry and exit costs do not affect the incentives for firms to grow. For
proportional costs, if we analyze each in turn, hiring costs (P SU) would reduce growth
while entry costs (PEN) would promote growth. On the other hand, firing costs
(P SD) would increase firm growth, while exit costs (PEX) would reduce growth. As
we discussed above, we avoid introducing these asymmetries because they lead to
arguably artificial biases in entry, exit and growth decisions. For example, if the
entry cost is smaller than the hiring cost, then firms would start larger in order to
save on expected hiring costs in the following period.
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2.5 Calibration Under Finite Learning Horizon
In the previous two sections, we developed heuristic arguments about the effect of
adjustment costs on the cohort’s average growth rate and then proved those results
in a simplified version of the model. We now wish to assess the contribution of
adjustment costs to explain some of the basic facts on firm dynamics found in section
2.2, both for the overall economy and for the manufacturing and services sectors in
Portugal. Therefore, in this section we perform some computational and calibration
experiments.
Simulation of an infinite learning horizon model is potentially a difficult task
because V S depends on the firm’s age. This prevents us from using an iterative
method that in each iteration provides some converging approximation to the value
function or the policy function. Therefore, we follow the suggestion of Ljungqvist and
Sargent (2000, p. 109) and consider an approximation where firms live forever, but
learn their ex post true productivity component, μ1, with certainty at some age T .
25
In our simulations, we assume that F is Cobb-Douglas, i.e., F (L) = Lα, α ∈ (0, 1).
Under this assumption, with no adjustment costs, optimal employment would be given
by
L∗τ = L (θ
∗









, if θ∗τ ≥ θEXτ ,




Therefore, with α ∈ (0, 1), optimal employment conditional on survival is a convex
function of θ∗τ , so that Jensen’s inequality implies growth of employment even in the
absence of selection. As in the previous section, in order to avoid any growth due to
Jensen’s inequality, we take logs of all variables and analyze the effects of adjustment
costs on the log-growth rate.
Concerning the productivity distribution, we assume ξ (η) = exp {η}, so that
25Note that this T differs from the lifetime horizon T̄ used in section 2.4, with T̄ ≥ T . In this
section, we assume an infinite horizon, so that T̄ = ∞. In our simulations and calibrations below,
we assume that T = 14 (years), and present results until year 10.
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θτ follows a lognormal distribution.26 This assumption is made for computational
simplicity, although it is also reasonable on empirical grounds (see Aw, Chen and
Roberts 2004). Besides this, the results in section 2.4 suggest that the distribution of
productivity mostly affects the intensity of the effect of adjustment costs on growth
of firms, but not the sign. In fact, propositions 8 and 9 are derived independently
of the particular distribution of θ∗τ . Given this assumption, we have the following
proposition concerning the transition law for the θ∗s.
Proposition 10 Let θτ = exp {ητ} be generated as in assumption 1. Then,





if τ < T , and Ωτ = {μ0, μ1} if τ ≥ T , is
θτ+j |Ωτ∼ logN
¡




where, for τ < T , Yτ and Zτ are defined in (2.2), and, for τ ≥ T , Yτ = μ and Zτ = 0.
Let θ∗τ = E (θτ | Ωτ) = E (θτ | θ∗τ , τ). Then the distribution of θ∗τ+j (j ≥ 1) given
(θ∗τ , τ) is
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Proof. See appendix A.1.
Since we assume that the firm enters the industry already knowing its ex ante
productivity component μ0 (see assumption 1), we will get a non-degenerate distrib-
26This assumption makes ν1 = 0, and ν2 = ∞. Even though this violates assumption 1, it
does not pose any problem in this section, since we will be using a discrete approximation to this
distribution.
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0 has positive variance
in the cohort’s initial distribution. The next proposition analyzes the properties of
the optimization problem after μ is revealed to the firm in period T .
Proposition 11 If μ is revealed to the firm at period T , then all adjustments are
made at period T , and the firm will not change its exit and employment decisions
after that period. This means that
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Proof. See appendix A.1.
This result enables us to simplify the computational algorithm significantly, since
it implies a finite horizon dynamic programming problem. In appendix A.2, we present
some details concerning the computational algorithm. Our method requires only that
we compute the optimal employment and exit decisions numerically, and then include
these in the recursive expressions used to obtain all relevant densities and moments
in the model. This is an important simplification since our dynamic programming
problem is not age independent, and we are using a finite learning horizon, so that we
could not implement an iterative procedure converging to an ergodic distribution of
optimal employment. In the next subsection, we present a calibration of the learning
model with adjustment costs, and leave for the following subsection a sensitivity
analysis.
2.5.1 Calibration with Costly Adjustment
We now calibrate our model to match statistics from the 1988 cohort of all entering
firms. We first calibrate parameters related to inputs directly from the data. We then
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search for values of the parameters associated with the learning process to match the
evolution of firm size and exit observed in the data. Finally, we search for values
of the adjustment cost parameters that produce a survivor component close to that
found in the data. Similarly to section 2.2, our decomposition of the change in the
cohort’s average size is the following
E [ln (Lτ) | Sτ ]−E [ln (L0) | S0] = E [ln (Lτ )− ln (L0) | Sτ ]| {z }
Survivor Component
+
Pr (Dτ | S0) {E [ln (L0) | Sτ ]−E [ln (L0) | Dτ ]}| {z }
Selection Component
In appendix A.2, we give details on how to compute the densities associated with
each of these moments.
We now explain in more detail our calibration method. The parameters α and w
are calibrated with data from INE (1997) containing the Inquérito Annual às Empre-
sas from 1990 to 1995. This data is reliable and covers all firms in the Portuguese
economy, with sampling among firms with less than 20 workers. We measure α as the
1990-1995 average of the cost share of labor in value added, and w as the 1990-1995
average cost per worker. We can also obtain these values at the one-digit sectoral
level. We deflated all nominal variables using the GDP sectoral price indices available
in the updated version of Séries Longas para a Economia Portuguesa in Banco de
Portugal (1997). The real interest rate is calibrated as the 1990-1995 average of the
implicit real interest rate on public debt transactions on the secondary market of the
Lisbon Stock Exchange. The data was also taken from Banco de Portugal (1997). We
deflated the nominal interest rates using the December-to-December consumer price
index from INE (1990—1995). The discount rate was then obtained as β = 1
1+r
, where
r is the average real interest rate.
The calibration of W deserves some discussion. First, the main purpose of this
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parameter is to induce endogenous exit of firms in our model. In Hopenhayn (1992),
the same is accomplished using a fixed per period operating cost, instead of an exit
opportunity cost (Jovanovic 1982). In proposition 12 of appendix A.1, we show the
equivalence between the two mechanisms, since the per period opportunity cost is just
the annuity value of the exit opportunity cost. Second, because we omit capital in
our model, the calibration of W should be based on the expected discounted future
stream of value added minus labor costs, adjusted for the initial research cost, I.
Therefore, we obtain a measure for W equal to the annuity value of the 1990-1995
average of value added minus labor costs, using the same deflators as for w. However,
this is certainly an overestimate for the true value of W , since the sample is biased
towards surviving firms. Third, if for a given value of W we use the parameters
governing the learning process to match the exit rate in the cohort of firms, then W
will indirectly determine the cohort’s average size. Because of this, and because of
the stated overestimation ofW , we calibrate W in order to match both the exit rates
and the average size of firms in the cohort.27
The remaining parameters are calibrated to match the evidence on cohort dynam-
ics presented in section 2.2. First, for the given values of α, w, β we search for values
of μ̄, σμ0 , σμ1, σ, and W that make the model’s implications for the time-series of
the cross-sectional mean of log-employment conditional on survival, E [ln (Lτ) | Sτ ],
the time-series of annual changes in the cross-sectional standard deviation of log-
employment conditional on survival, SD [ln (Lτ ) | Sτ ], and the time-series of the cu-
mulative exit rate, Pr (Dτ | S0), closest to the equivalent moments in the data. Sec-
ond, we search for values of the adjustment cost parameters that enable the model
to simultaneously match the time-series of the survivor component, in addition to
27When we calibrateW as measured from the data (1373.8 for the overall economy cohort, 3317.1
for the manufacturing cohort, and 269.1 for the services cohort) we obtain qualitatively similar results
for the calibration of adjustment cost parameters, and we are able to match the observed survivor
component, but largely overestimate the cohort’s average size. This shows thatW is not determinant
to explain the survivors’ contribution to firm growth.
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Table 2.4: Calibration to the 1988 Firm Cohort
Sector
Overall Economy Manufacturing Services
NAC AC AC AC
α 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.73
w 11.8 11.8 13.1 7.5
β 0.956 0.956 0.956 0.956
W 666.3 716.3 1500 178.5
σμ0 0.180 0.180 0.110 0.121
σμ1 0.210 0.218 0.212 0.146
σ 0.350 0.350 0.350 0.250
μ̄ 3.380 3.387 3.800 2.528
I 114.3 102.9 180.9 44.6
P 0.0 0.55 1.6 0.2
FEX 0.0 7.0 25.0 1
dw(mlL) 1.643 0.973 7.011 2.452
dw(sdlL) 0.4796 0.5030 1.0737 1.9898
dw(ER) 10658 10652 14004 13031
dw(SuC) 32676 4874 51994 12817
Notes: NAC refers to a calibration when adjustment costs
are absent; AC refers to a calibration when adjustment
costs are present; P = PH = PF ; dw(·) is the weighted
distance measure associated with average size, mlL, stan-
dard deviation of size sdlL, exit rate ER, and survivor
component SuC. In all cases, FSU = FSD = FEN = 0.
the previous moments. In doing this, we adjust the other parameters as needed, so
that the goodness of fit in terms of cross-sectional size and exit rates, at the least,
does not worsen significantly. Finally, p is normalized to 1 and I is obtained by the
equilibrium condition I = E (V0 (θ
∗
0))−W .28
The values for all parameters are in table 2.4, where we include calibrations for
the overall economy, the manufacturing sector and the services sector cohorts. To
illustrate the process of calibration, for the overall economy cohort we include the
calibrated parameters both with and without adjustment costs. In all cases, we
consider that FSD = FSU = 0, since these two fixed costs have effects of opposite
sign on the survivor component. However, we consider a positive value for the fixed
28As a measure for the goodness of fit between the model generated cross-sectional moments, x,
and the observed moments, y, we use a weighted quadratic form, dw = (x− y)0Σ−1 (x− y), where
Σ is obtained from the variance-covariance matrix of the cross-sectional (unconditional) distribution
of θ∗τ (see proposition 10). Therefore, a larger weight is given to the distance between the first few
moments after entry.
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cost of exit, even though the results are very similar if instead we consider a positive
value for the fixed cost of entry. As we argue below, these fixed costs of entry and exit
do not directly affect the incentives for firms to grow, but reduce firms’ exit rates.
From table 2.4, we verify in our calibrated model without adjustment costs that
most information is revealed ex post (σμ1 > σμ0), and that there is significant noise
in the learning process (σ > σμ0 σ > σμ1). For the overall economy cohort, we
were able to significantly improve the fit of the survivor component with a symmetric
proportional adjustment cost that amounts to 4.7% of the annual wage, and a fixed
exit cost that amounts to 60% of the annual wage. This fact can be seen in figure
2.2, where we plot the data moments and the equivalent moments in the calibrated
model with (AC ) and without (NAC ) adjustment costs.
Figure 2.2 shows that even though the model with no adjustment costs is able to
generate moments on firm size and exit rates that are close to equivalent moments
in the data, it cannot satisfactorily match the observed values for the survivors’
contribution. That is, the model with no adjustment costs cannot explain the true
source for growth in the cohort’s average size, since survivors contribute much more
to growth in the data than in such a model. This shortcoming occurs especially in
the initial years after entry, since in the data the path of the survivors’ component is
almost flat, whereas in the model with no adjustment costs the survivors’ component
is increasing. This positive slope of the model generated survivor component reflects
the fact that with no adjustment costs, learning has a larger initial impact on selection
than that on growth of survivors.
In table 2.4, we also calibrate the model to the data for manufacturing and ser-
vices, and in table 2.5 we present a summary of the implied moments. Firms in
manufacturing initially learn relatively less about their efficiency than firms in ser-
vices, and adjustment costs need to be much higher in manufacturing than in services















































































































































































































Figure 2.2: Firm Dynamics for Overall Economy Cohort
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Table 2.5: Firm Dynamics in Calibration for the 1988 Firm Cohort
Sector
AvEmp CumEx SurComp
89 98 89 98 89 98
All: Data 1.11 1.57 17.2 58.0 69.5 68.5
All: AC 1.12 1.55 16.1 50.0 68.4 70.7
Manu: Data 1.58 2.25 15.7 58.3 87.8 83.5
Manu: AC 1.66 2.15 14.5 50.9 81.8 84.9
Serv: Data 0.99 1.35 18.9 57.6 60.3 60.9
Serv: AC 0.97 1.43 15.5 46.6 61.1 65.2
Notes: AvEmp is the mean of log-employment among
survivors; CumEx is the cumulative exit rate (in %);
SurComp is the survivor component (in %); Data refers
to observed values; AC refers to simulated values from
a calibration when adjustment costs are present.
son exercise between manufacturing and services suggests that firms in manufacturing
pay a higher initial research cost (I is higher) and face a higher fixed exit cost (FEX
is higher), so that even though they learn less initially about their efficiency (σμ0/σμ1
is smaller), there is more initial selection (1−Pr (S0) equals 22.5% in manufacturing
and 20.6% in services). Because manufacturing firms face much higher proportional
adjustment costs and they know relatively less about efficiency at entry, they have
higher incentives to start smaller and to gradually adjust to optimal size as they
survive and their uncertainty is resolved. Simultaneously, a larger fixed exit cost
implies that in manufacturing selection at entry is larger and post-entry selection
is smaller. The consequence is that the contribution of survivors to growth in the
cohort’s average size is larger in manufacturing than in services.
2.5.2 Sensitivity Analysis
In this subsection we explain some aspects of the calibration exercise and provide
a detailed sensitivity analysis to all parameters in the model. First, note that we
do not attempt to match the level of the cross-sectional variance of log-employment,
but only its change over time. This is because to fit the observed level of dispersion
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in employment, we would need to make both σμ0 and σμ1 much larger. This would
enable us to match SD [ln (Lτ) | Sτ ] and Pr (Dτ | S0), but would imply an excessive
rate of growth in E [ln (Lτ) | Sτ ]. However, this failure is not a serious problem. It
just means that only a fraction of the observed cohort’s employment dispersion can
be attributed to a Bayesian learning process about efficiency. The remaining part
could be attributed to heterogeneity in the initial choice of technology. For instance,
consider a model with capital and suppose that a firm chooses its initial stock of
capital, K0, based on its observation of a random variable indexing technology choice.
Assume further, that after selecting K0 the firm keeps its capital stock unchanged for
its remaining life. Then, conditional on the chosen value of K0, the problem would
become
V (K0, Lτ−1, θ
∗
τ , τ) = max
Lτ
©
Π (K0, Lτ , θ
∗





V EX (K0, Lτ) , V
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K0, Lτ , θ
∗
τ+1, τ + 1
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If the production function has constant returns to scale, if the opportunity cost is
proportional to K0, i.e., W = W̃K0, where W̃ is the opportunity cost per unit of
capital, and if all fixed adjustment costs are also proportional to K0, then the above
problem could be equivalently stated as29
V (K0, Lτ−1, θ
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, θ∗τ+1, τ + 1
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Therefore, in this alternative framework, dispersion in K0 would govern the initial
dispersion in employment and only the subsequent evolution in this dispersion would
29If fixed adjustment costs were less than proportional to K0, then this model would explain why
larger firms tend to exhibit smaller exit rates, since for the given equilibrium price larger firms would
be relatively more profitable.
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depend on the Bayesian learning process. This is the reason why we attempt to
match only the evolution of SD [ln (Lτ) | Sτ ], but not its level. After simulating the
calibrated model we can infer what fraction of the observed dispersion in the cohort’s
log-employment is attributable to the learning process itself.
In order to make clear the dynamic behavior of the cohort’s log-employment dis-
persion, we rescale the model’s implied initial value of SD [ln (Lτ) | Sτ ] to the level
found in the data. In the calibrated model without adjustment costs the value of
SD [ln (L0) | S0] is 0.2833, while in the data it is 0.9005. Therefore, only little more
than 30% of the observed dispersion in the cohort’s log-employment is needed to
account for the exit rate and growth in average size.
Second, the value of σμ0/σμ1 affects the long-run contribution of survivors, since a
relatively smaller initial dispersion would make the average size of exiting firms closer
to the average size of surviving firms in the entry period, and in this case most growth
would be due to survivors. In the aforementioned extended model with an initial
choice over K0, if we had σμ0 = 0 we would have a non-degenerate initial distribution
of size, entirely due to the heterogeneity in K0, but the survivors’ component would
still be 100% in each period. This would occur because the distribution of initial size
among exiting firms would be equal to the distribution of initial size in the cohort of
all entering firms. This also explains why even with heterogeneity over K0, we would
still need to assume σμ0 > 0 in order to match the empirical facts on the importance
of the survivor component.
While we could increase the long-run contribution of survivors by tinkering with
the ratio σμ0/σμ1 , without adjustment costs the model cannot match the observed
flatness in the path of the survivors’ component. For any choice of σμ0 and σμ1 , it
will always be the case that the survivors’ component will exhibit an increasing path
in the absence of adjustment costs. This is because without adjustment costs the
reduction in uncertainty is more important than the persistence aspect associated
49
Table 2.6: Sensitivity Analysis for All Economy Cohort (NAC, I)
Param NAC Range
CumEx SurComp
89 98 89 98
Data 17.2 59.6 69.5 68.5
Case NAC 17.0 52.1 42.7 58.5
α 0.56 0.44—0.71 15.3—26.3 46.1—60.7 39.6—47.4 56.0—60.8
β 0.956 0.931—0.976 18.7—15.3 52.3—50.5 45.6—39.6 59.8—56.4
w 11.8 9.3—13.8 17.0 52.1 42.7 58.5
W 666.3 586.3—766.3 20.2—18.7(1) 51.4—52.8(1) 39.4—45.6 55.1—59.7
σμ0 0.18 0.09-0.36 17.8-17.5
(1) 53.1—46.3 57.3—29.5 76.6—38.8
σμ1 0.21 0.12—0.39 5.94—46.0 26.6—74.6 20.9—72.4 33.3—79.8
σ 0.35 0.26—0.53 27.8—9.8 56.7—41.9 47.1—34.3 58.1—53.3
μ̄ 3.38 3.13-3.58 17.0 52.1 42.7 58.5
I 114.3 73.9—163.9 20.4—18.2 57.5—48.1 48.4—36.4 62.5—53.1
Notes: CumEx is the cumulative exit rate (in %); SurComp is the survivor component
(in %); NAC refers to calibrated and simulated values when adjustment costs are absent.
(1): does not behave monotonically due to discretization.
with the learning mechanism Since the intensity of selection is mostly dependent
on the reduction in uncertainty, then its relevance for firm growth decreases as firms
age. Note also that the ratio σμ0/σμ1affects both the exit rate and the evolution of
the cross-sectional firm size dispersion. If this ratio becomes too small, post-entry
exit rates become excessively high and the size dispersion increases too fast. This
is the reason why in the model without adjustment costs we cannot find a value for
this ratio that attains the long-run contribution of survivors found in the data, and
simultaneously matches the behavior of the cumulative exit rate and the evolution
of cross-sectional size dispersion. Therefore, the value we select for this ratio is
disciplined by the exit rates and the evolution of firm size dispersion in the cohort.
Third, to show that proportional adjustment costs are crucial for our model to
fit the evidence on the survivors’ contribution to growth in the cohort’s average size,
we perform a sensitivity analysis with respect to each parameter in the model. We
take as benchmark the calibrated model with no adjustment cost for the overall
economy cohort. In table 2.6 we present the sensitivity analysis with respect to every
parameter except adjustment costs, and in table 2.7 we present the sensitivity analysis
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Table 2.7: Sensitivity Analysis for All Economy Cohort (NAC, II)
Param NAC Range
CumEx SurComp
89 98 89 98
Data 17.2 59.6 69.5 68.5
Case NAC 17.0 52.1 42.7 58.5
PH 0 0.0—5.0 17.0—13.9 52.1—46.5 42.7—71.8 58.5—73.7
PF 0 0.0—5.0 17.0—13.9 52.1—46.5 42.7—71.8 58.5—73.8
FH 0 0.0—10.0 17.0—13.9 52.1—47.2 42.7—(1) 58.5—(1)
FF 0 0.0—10.0 17.0—13.9 52.1—47.1 42.7—74.1 58.5—78.3
P 0 0.0—5.0 17.0—14.7 52.1—44.7 42.7—68.3 58.5—73.5
F 0 0.0—10.0 17.0—10.9 52.1—43.1 42.7—34.8 58.5—68.9
Notes: CumEx is the cumulative exit rate (in %); SurComp is the survivor com-
ponent (in %); NAC refers to calibrated and simulated values when adjustment
costs are absent; PH corresponds to PH = PEN = PSU , and similarly for FH ;
PF corresponds to PF = PEX = PSD, and similarly for FF ; P corresponds
to P = PH = PF , and similarly for F . (1): decreases and eventually becomes
negative.
with respect to the adjustment cost parameters.
From table 2.6, we see that the model without adjustment costs cannot match
simultaneously the exit rate and the contribution of survivors to growth in the cohort’s
average size even if we allow parameters to vary one by one from their benchmark
values. The only parameters that significantly affect the survivor component are σμ0
and σμ1 . However, they also affect significantly the exit rates and the evolution of firm
size dispersion (not shown in the table). In particular, we can see that reducing σμ0
and increasing σμ1 increases the survivor component, while maintaining its positive
slope, and increases exit rates.
From table 2.7, we conclude that no other parameters besides proportional costs
and fixed firing costs enable us to match both the exit behavior and the survivor
component. The main effect of these costs is to put more emphasis on individual firm
growth in the initial years of life, when selection is very intense. Another result that
comes out of this sensitivity analysis is that PH and PF produce almost identical
results. This should be expected when β is very high, as is the case here, since the
incentives created by proportional hiring/entry and firing/exit costs differ only in the
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Figure 2.3: Proportional Adjustment Cost: P = PH = PF
displacement of timing by one period.30
The key element in replicating the evidence on the contribution of survivors is
the proportional adjustment cost. To show that proportional adjustment costs are
in fact the key factor, and that the fixed exit cost plays a secondary role in this
respect, we present in figure 2.3 the impact of changes in P = PH = PF on the
survivor component, assuming the values in column 3 of table 2.4 for the remaining
parameters, including FEX = 7. We conclude that FEX > 0 is not the crucial element
to increase the value of the survivor component, especially in the initial post-entry
periods, and that allowing for even a small value of P has a significant impact on the
survivors’ contribution, with a larger effect in the initial years of life.
FEX is important to control both the fraction of firms that never enter the indus-
30This suggests that if we used data on firm dynamics to estimate adjustment cost parameters,
we would find PH and PF to be nearly unidentifiable, since asymmetry between them only slightly
affects the distribution of the employment growth rate. Therefore, our estimation would need to
assume PH = PF = P .
52
try, 1−Pr (S0), and the amount of exit in the initial post-entry periods, Pr (Dτ | Sτ−1).
As FEX increases the first fraction increases, since it is costly to actually exit the in-
dustry once the firm decides to enter, and the second probability decreases since there
is a larger initial selection. Therefore, by changing FEX we have more freedom to
adjust σμ0/σμ1 to account for the long-run survivor component, without distorting
much the initial exit rates. The proportional adjustment costs, besides increasing the
long-run value of the survivor component, make its path flatter. This is what makes
P crucial, since it puts more emphasis on firm growth, and not so much on firm exit
in the first few post-entry periods.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we propose a model of Bayesian learning with linear and nonconvex
adjustment costs, and show that most forms of adjustment costs will generate a bias
towards firm growth. We present new evidence showing that firm size dynamics in
the Portuguese economy are driven largely by growth of survivors rather than selec-
tion and pruning of small weak firms, and that there exist significant cross-sectoral
differences between manufacturing and services in the contribution of survivors to
average size growth. Our calibrations and simulations indicate that adjustment costs
can generate plausible patterns of cohort size dynamics, and can explain differences
between manufacturing and services. In particular, proportional adjustment costs
and the fixed exit cost are the key parameters to explain the high contribution of
survivors to growth in the cohorts’ average size, and these costs are much larger in
manufacturing than in services. Therefore, our theory is an alternative to financing
constraints as an explanation for the significant growth of survivors, and seems to be
better suited to explain cross industry differences.
This project could be extended in several ways. First, we could use the model to
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estimate adjustment cost parameters for particular economic sectors, namely manu-
facturing and services.31 Second, we could attempt to distinguish our model empiri-
cally from theories based on financing constraints. We could also attempt to explain
the evidence that, even for narrowly defined industries, there are significant differ-
ences in the firm size distribution between countries. Bartelsman et al. (2005, p.
26) interpret this as evidence that different institutional settings manifest themselves
in different adjustment costs structures, which then have implications for firm size
distributions:
... if certain administrative costs at entry are fixed, then the higher
these costs (as in a number of European countries compared with the
United States and the United Kingdom) the greater the disincentives for
relatively small units to enter the market and then expand in the initial
years. Likewise, post entry adjustments in employment may be hindered
by tight hiring and firing restrictions and the latter are more restrictive
in a number of European countries than in the United States.
Matching cross-country and cross-industry variation in the structure of adjustment
costs with variation in the firm size distribution and cohort dynamics would give
strong support for our hypothesis.





Matter for Job Flow Dynamics?
3.1 Introduction
The literature studying the process of labor reallocation across businesses is now
large. It has emphasized both the magnitude and cyclicality of flows of job creation
and job destruction, and their different patterns across heterogeneous units defined
by characteristics such as size and age. It has also found the significant sectoral
differences in the cyclical behavior of job reallocation (the overall flows of job creation
and job destruction) and in the age and size composition of business units. In this
chapter, we analyze whether the sectoral distribution of types of firms is an important
element in understanding aggregate job flow dynamics and cross-sector differences in
the patterns of job reallocation. We also gauge the empirical relevance of sectoral
differences in firm types using firm level job flows data in the Portuguese economy.
Some of the stylized facts associated with gross reallocation activities were first
laid out by Davis and Haltiwanger (1990, 1992) and Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh
(1996) with plant level information for the U.S. manufacturing sector from the Cen-
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sus Bureau’s Longitudinal Research Database (LRD). One of their stylized facts that
deserves special attention is the larger volatility of job destruction relative to job
creation, meaning that job reallocation increases in recessions and decreases in ex-
pansions.1 In their analysis of different patterns across types of firms, the authors
find that the countercyclical reallocation of jobs is a phenomenon associated with
older and larger plants. Davis et al. (1996) and Lane, Stevens and Burgess (1996)
(using unemployment compensation data for the state of Maryland) also conclude
that young and small firms have higher rates of job creation, job destruction and
reallocation, and that young firms display larger growth rates than old firms. Along
a similar line, based on the same dataset used by Lane et al. (1996), Burgess, Lane
and Stevens (2000) emphasize the impact of the firm’s lifecycle on the patterns of
reallocation. They conclude that young and dying firms account for about a third of
all job reallocation, and that job reallocation is more important among young firms
whereas worker reallocation (the overall flows of workers over a set of jobs, including
job-to-job transitions) is more important among mature firms.
This particular evidence led to the proposal of theories that could account for
the level and countercyclical behavior of reallocation. Caballero (1992) explains the
higher relative volatility of job destruction using an (S,s) model with asymmetric
aggregate shocks, in the sense that contractions are shorter and more severe than
expansions. In Caballero and Hammour (1994) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994),
job reallocation is countercyclical because job creation is time-consuming and costly,
whereas job destruction is not and responds immediately to recessions. In Campbell
and Fisher (2000), symmetric proportional costs of creation and destruction cause
shrinking plants to be more sensitive to aggregate shocks than growing plants, so
1Given that job reallocation is the sum of job creation and job destruction, and that net employ-
ment growth equals their difference, countercyclical reallocation activity implies a higher cyclical
variability of job destruction than job creation. This is so because job creation will tend to be
procyclical and job destruction will tend to be countercyclical, and the higher volatility in job de-
struction will cause job destruction to be the dominating force in the volatility of job reallocation.
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that job destruction becomes more volatile than job creation.
The view that reallocation is countercyclical was later questioned based on addi-
tional evidence for the U.S. and other countries. Boeri (1996) argues that the apparent
countercyclical nature of job reallocation is the result of a selection bias against small
and young firms in the LRD data, since only establishments with more than five
workers are considered and the sample is renewed every five years. This sample bias,
and the fact that the LRD data contains only information for manufacturing, causes
an underestimation of gross job creation.
Foote (1998) confirms this argument in unemployment insurance based data for
Michigan, where the higher volatility of job destruction in manufacturing does not
hold in other sectors like services and retail trade. Foote then presents a simple
model in which the cyclical properties of input reallocation are a function of the
sector’s trend growth rate, since the sign of trend employment growth indicates the
margin on which firms are more active. In an expanding sector, firms are more active
on the creation margin, especially in a favorable aggregate state, so that reallocation
is procyclical. Foote tests his model empirically and finds that the model cannot fully
account for the magnitude of sectoral differences between manufacturing and services
in the relative volatility of job destruction and creation.
In an attempt to account for the unsatisfactory results of Foote (1998), Davis and
Haltiwanger (1999) analyze if composition effects can explain cross-sector differences
in the cyclical behavior of gross job flows. The authors conclude that, among four-
digit manufacturing sectors, the relative volatility of job destruction is negatively
affected by trend growth and positively affected by firm size and age. This suggests
that the higher relative volatility of job destruction in manufacturing partly results
from it being mostly composed of larger and older firms, while the opposite is true
for the services sector.
This evidence suggests that different industries face different technological, de-
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mand, and legal constraints which determine the characteristics of the average firm
in the sector, and the dynamics of firm entry and exit. These characteristics could
then explain, in part, the behavior of gross job flows in the sector. In this paper, we
investigate to what extent differences in the age and size distributions can explain
differences in the cyclical properties of gross job flows across sectors.
In order to analyze the impact of age and size heterogeneities on job flows, follow-
ing Bertola and Caballero (1990) and Foote (1998), we use an (S,s) descriptive model
of the process of labor reallocation over the business cycle, and consider structural
heterogeneity among the firms in a sector. We derive analytical expressions for job
creation and job destruction and show how their dynamics depend on the structural
parameters of the model. These expressions show us the parameters that might ex-
plain the marked differences between young and small firms, on the one hand, and
large and old firms, on the other hand. We conclude that the distribution of types is
relevant for the cyclical properties of aggregate gross job flows when (and only when)
heterogeneous types display differences in their relative responsiveness to aggregate
shocks versus idiosyncratic shocks.
Using Portuguese data, we find evidence that large and old firms are relatively
more affected by aggregate shocks than small and young firms. This means that large
and old firms affect aggregate job flow dynamics more than their employment share
would suggest. Consequently, aggregate job reallocation tends to be more counter-
cyclical than what would be expected from employment shares of each type of firm.
We then analyze the cyclical properties of job reallocation in four Portuguese sec-
tors: manufacturing, transportation, services, and retail trade. In each of the sectors,
we identify characteristics of old and large firms that influence aggregate job flow
dynamics.
This chapter is concerned with a topic similar to that of Campbell and Fisher
(2004). Campbell and Fisher argue that the larger volatility of job reallocation among
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young firms relative to old firms is the result of an optimal substitution by young firms
from structured jobs, with high productivity nut high adjustment costs, to unstruc-
tured jobs with lower productivity and lower adjustment costs. This substitution
occurs because young firms face larger idiosyncratic shocks. Therefore, young firms
benefit from increased flexibility that compensates for the decrease in productivity.
This substitution, motivated by a higher idiosyncratic risk, in turn implies that young
firms become more sensitive to aggregate shocks due to increased flexibility. In this
chapter, instead of emphasizing standard deviations, we emphasize coefficients of vari-
ation of gross job flows. Because young firms display larger gross job flows on average,
it is not surprising that the cyclical volatility of gross flows is also larger among young
firms, since standard deviations are scale dependent. On the contrary, coefficients of
variation are scale independent, and we show that they identify the importance of
each type of firm to aggregate job flow dynamics. We also show that coefficients of
variation of gross job flows are larger for old and larger firms, an indication that they
are more important for aggregate cyclical behavior.
A final remark about why we should look at heterogeneity along the age and size
dimensions is in Boeri (1996, p. 620):
... the variance of establishment-level employment changes in any in-
dustry is by and large the main component of job turnover [...]. Insofar as
this heterogeneity plays an important role in the time variation of gross
job flows [...] the identification of the main sources of this heterogeneity
can also shed some light on the determinants of aggregate outcomes.
In section 3.2, we present a basic (S,s) model of employment adjustment in
continuous-time and derive expressions for the implied job flows statistics. In sec-
tion 3.3, we extend the model to consider structural heterogeneity across firms. In
section 3.4, we present Portuguese evidence for the aggregate economy and for four
sectors. We conclude in section 3.5.
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3.2 (S,s) Model of Employment Adjustment
In this section, we analyze what a model of (S,s) adjustment predicts for the behavior
of gross job flows as a function of the underlying structural parameters of the firm.
By better understanding the determinants of job flows we can potentially explain the
marked differences between young and old firms, and analyze whether age and size
heterogeneities can account for the sectoral differences in the behavior of aggregate
gross job flows. We use the same model employed by Bertola and Caballero (1990)
to study the consumption of durable goods in the U.S., and later by Foote (1998) to
study the cyclical volatility of gross job flows across U.S. sectors.
3.2.1 Basic Assumptions
We now briefly describe the main assumptions of the model. In appendix B.1, we
present more detail about the model’s assumptions and solution. To generate cyclical
variability in the pattern of employment adjustment in the cross-section of firms, the
model assumes that each plant’s optimal employment level is driven by both an aggre-
gate and an idiosyncratic component. Specifically, the stochastic process governing
the frictionless log of employment has an aggregate drift and exhibits both aggregate
and idiosyncratic uncertainty. The aggregate drift and uncertainty can be seen as
sector specific, or, more generally, as involving both an economy wide and a sector
specific aggregate component. For our analysis, only the net aggregate component
would be relevant, since we are not interested in analyzing the co-movement across
sectors in gross job flows.
In terms of notation, we use t to indicate time, and i to name the i-th firm. We
assume that, in the absence of adjustment costs, the optimal level of log-employment
for the firm is driven by an arithmetic Brownian motion,
e∗t,i = at + σIwI,t,i, at = μt+ σawa,t, (3.1)
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where e∗t,i is the time t frictionless log-level of employment for the i-th firm, at is the
aggregate component of the stochastic process, σIwI,t,i is the idiosyncratic component,
and wI,t,i and wa,t are independent Wiener processes. This implies that the growth
rate of employment per unit of time has mean μ + 1
2
σ2, and fluctuates around the
mean due to normally distributed aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks with mean zero
and variances σ2a and σ
2
I , respectively. Since for each firm the source of uncertainty
is irrelevant, we can rewrite the above process as







where wt,i is a Wiener process, and μ, σ are sector specific.2 Note that σdwt,i has
exactly the same stochastic properties as σIdwI,t,i + σadwa,t, so that the correlation
coefficient between the shocks of different firms is σ2a/σ
2.3
Note that we could justify the structure of (3.1) and (3.2) by considering a simple
model of frictionless employment determination in which the firm sets the marginal
revenue product equal to the wage each period (assuming input and output markets
are perfectly competitive). If the production function is Cobb-Douglas, subject to a
productivity shock, that is, F (E, θ) = Eαθ, and the firm observes θ before taking its
decision, then optimal employment in logs would be given by,
e∗ = (1− α)−1 (lnα− lnW ) + (1− α)−1 ln θ,
2Since the log of employment follows an arithmetic Brownian motion, the level of employment
follows a geometric Brownian motion. Namely, using the algebra of Itô’s calculus, if we denote the















The implication is that the mean (instantaneous) growth rate of employment is constant, and the
standard deviation of employment level increments grows with the (employment) size of the firm.
3Of course, the actual path of {wt,i} must be chosen so that σwt,i = σIwI,t,i + σawa,t, at all
points in time.
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where W denotes the wage. Now, if W is fixed over time, and the dynamic behavior
of θ is characterized by





then log employment would follow (3.2). Note that equation (3.3) is valid whenever
technology shocks follow a random walk, since we can rewrite (3.3) as
ln θt = μ̃+ ln θt−dt + ε̃t,dt, μ̃ ≡ (1− α)μdt, ε̃t,dt ∼ N
¡
0, (1− α)2 σ2dt
¢
.
In general, the presence of firing and/or hiring costs implies that the firm will not
choose to set the employment level equal to the frictionless optimal value. In the
(S,s) model under consideration, the structure of those costs is as follows. Whenever
firms decide to adjust their actual log-level of employment, et,i, they incur both a
fixed and a proportional cost, so that the adjustment cost function is given by4
C (∆e) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩ Cl + cl∆e, if ∆e > 0,Cu − cu∆e, if ∆e < 0.
The existence of adjustment costs implies that, in deciding the optimal level of e,
firms will balance the benefits of closely following e∗ against the costs of doing so.
Therefore, following Bertola and Caballero (1990), we define z = e − e∗ as the ex-
cess of current employment over the frictionless employment, and assume that firms
choose an optimal path for zt in order to minimize the expected present value of lost
profits, due to the presence of adjustment costs, plus adjustment costs. Note that, in
the absence of adjustment, z follows a Brownian motion process with drift −μ and
4Here we are assuming that proportional costs apply to percentage changes in employment. The
alternative case, where employment follows a geometric Brownian motion and proportional costs




Harrison, Sellke and Taylor (1983) have shown that the optimal policy is charac-
terized by four parameters (L, l, u, U), such that z ∈ (L,U), and
∆e =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩ l − L > 0, if z = L,u− U < 0, if z = U .
This means that there is an inaction region between L and U , and that whenever z
hits L employment increases by ∆e = l−L > 0, and whenever z hits U employment
decreases by ∆e = u−U < 0. In this policy rule there is both infrequent adjustment,
in that the employment gap must be high enough so that the marginal benefit of
adjustment equals the marginal cost of adjusting, and lumpy adjustment, in that
adjustment must be high enough so that the (discrete) benefit of adjusting equals
the (discrete) costs of adjusting. The first aspect of adjustment, intermittence, is a
function of the proportional and fixed adjustment costs, whereas the second aspect
of adjustment, lumpiness, is a function of the fixed adjustment costs.5 Both of these
features are easily observed in the micro data on employment adjustment.6
In this model, there is an ergodic distribution for the firm location over the state
variable z (see appendix B.1). However, the cross-sectional distribution over z will not
converge in the face of aggregate shocks. This is due to the fact that in (3.1) there is an
aggregate uncertainty component, σawa,t, which is common to all firms in the sector.
This implies that when there is a positive aggregate shock, dwa,t > 0, all firms in the
sector will face the same decrease in zt,i, so that the cross-sectional distribution over
z moves in a parallel way to the left by σadwa,t. However, following Foote (1998), we
solve for job flows statistics using the firm’s ergodic distribution as an approximation
5Note that if Cu = Cl = 0, then we will have L = l < 0, and u = U > 0, so that there is no
lumpy adjustment. On the other hand, if cu = cl = 0, then we will have l = u = 0, so that firms
fully adjust.
6See for example Hamermesh and Pfann (1996) and Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1997).
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for the time varying cross-sectional distribution, even if in a simulation of the model
it would be more accurate to use the second. This approximation allows us to obtain
analytical expressions for the impact of the underlying structural parameters on the
long-run statistical properties of job flows.
3.2.2 Job Flows Statistics
In order to obtain expressions for job flows, we use a random walk discrete-time
approximation to the Brownian motion process (see appendix B.1). Similarly to
Bertola and Caballero (1990) and Dixit (1991a), we consider the case of arbitrarily
small changes, so that
at+dt =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩ at + da, with probability pa,at − da, with probability qa = 1− pa,
where da = σa
√
dt, pa = 12
¡
1 + μ dt
da
¢
, and dt, da represent, respectively, the duration
of the discrete-time period and the length of each step taken by a in each period.
Without any adjustment, the employment gap for firm i evolves as
zt+dt,i =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩ zt,i + dz, with probability px,zt,i − dz, with probability qx = 1− px,
where dz = σ
√
dt, and the right expression for px depends on whether we are condi-


























= papz|b + qapz|r, unconditionally,
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where b stands for a boom, and r stands for a recession.7 Therefore, when there
is a boom in the sector, the probability that firm i’s employment gap will decrease
is higher than the probability that the employment gap will increase, because most
probably optimal employment will increase. Note, however, that the impact of the
aggregate shock on the firm-level probability is increasing in da/dz, which in turn
depends on the relative importance of aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks for firm-
level volatility. If σa/σ is low, then da/dz is low and aggregate shocks will have a
small impact on the direction of firm-level adjustment.
We now use the above stochastic process in order to derive appropriate expressions
for the job creation rate, the job destruction rate and their standard deviations. We
will start by deriving the discrete-time expressions, and then show that, as dt → 0
and dz → 0, with dz = σ
√
dt, these expressions converge to appropriate expressions
in continuous-time. Foote (1998) derived correct discrete-time expressions for the
job flows statistics, but without making clear the dependence of those expressions
on the structural parameters. Also, he did not derive the limiting continuous-time
expressions, which clarify that structural dependence.
In lemma 1 we prove that the discrete-time ergodic distribution converges in dis-
tribution to the continuous-time ergodic distribution.
Lemma 1 Let Fd (z; dz), Fc (z) be the discrete-time and continuous-time ergodic dis-
tributions of z implied by the (S,s) model under consideration. Then Fd converges in
distribution to Fc. That is
Fd (z; dz)→ Fc (z) , as dz ↓ 0, for all z ∈ R.
7Similarly to what is done in appendix B.1, it is possible to prove that this binomial random walk
mimics the main features of the continuous Brownian motion process, namely, E (∆at+dt) = μdt,
V ar (∆at+dt) = σ
2
adt, E (∆zt+∆t) = −μdt, V ar (∆zt+dt) = σ2dt. It is also true that as dt→ 0, the
above random walk process converges, in some appropriate way, to the Brownian motion process
with aggregate shocks in (3.1) and (3.2).
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Proof. See appendix B.2.
Now, we use this property to obtain continuous-time expressions for gross job
flows statistics. The results are in proposition 2.
Proposition 2 In the (S,s) model under consideration, assuming that the ergodic
distribution provides a good approximation to the cross-sectional distribution for pur-
poses of characterizing the long-run stochastic properties of the model, the aggregate
job creation rate (E (JC)), the aggregate job destruction rate (E (JD)), the aggregate
variance of job destruction (V ar (JD)), and the aggregate variance of job creation
(V ar (JC)) have the following continuous-time expressions:
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Proof. See appendix B.2.
Before we derive more explicit expressions for the continuous-time version of these
statistics, we describe as an example how E (JC) is calculated. Using the discrete-
time approximation, the job creation rate is obtained by
E (JC)d =
fd (Lz + dz; dz) qz (lz − Lz)
dt
,
that is, the expected job creation rate equals the per unit of time fraction of firms
located at the job creation border, fd(Lz+dz;dz)
dt
, times the probability that each of
those firms will receive a positive shock to employment, qz, times the amount of
(proportional) adjustment that a positive shock will generate, lz−Lz.8 The expression
for the job destruction rate has a similar interpretation.
8Note that the return and trigger points are defined in terms of logs, so that lz − Lz represents
the proportional increase in employment.
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In corollary 3, we present closed-form expressions for E (JC)c and E (JD)c.
Corollary 3 In the (S,s) model under consideration, assuming that the ergodic distri-
bution provides a good approximation to the cross-sectional distribution for purposes
of characterizing the long-run stochastic properties of the model, the aggregate job cre-
ation rate (E (JC)), the aggregate job destruction rate (E (JD)) have the following
continuous-time expressions:
(a) μ 6= 0:




























































ª¢ − 1#−1 .
(b) μ = 0:
E (JC)c =
σ2
(U + u− l − L) ,
E (JD)c =
σ2
(U + u− l − L) .
Proof. These expressions follow from proposition 2 and the expressions for fc in
appendix B.1.
We now make some comments on proposition 2 and corollary 3. First, we should
mention that E (JC)d, E (JD)d (in the appendix) are similar to the correspond-
ing expressions in Foote (1998), even though his statistics are not invariant to the
step size assumed for the random walk approximation. Second, the continuous-time
(approximate) expressions make clear the contribution of underlying parameters for
aggregate gross job flows behavior. By examining the case in which μ = 0, we can
see that adjustment costs asymmetries have a minor effect on relative job flows. The
main factors affecting the relative magnitude of E (JC) and E(JD) are μ and σ2.
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If μ > 0, then E (JC) > E (JD), and the difference will be higher the smaller is
σ2. This is because a positive trend growth rate causes firms to be bunched at job
creation border (a high value for f 0c (L), and a low value for −f 0c (U)), and the lower
is σ2 the higher will be this tendency, since there is less dispersion in employment
movements. Because the standard deviations of job flows are a linear function of
their means, these two factors are also the main source of asymmetries between the
volatility of job creation and the volatility of job destruction. This is precisely the
main insight of Foote (1998).








that is, the relative volatility of job destruction is just a linear function of the ratio of
the means of job destruction and job creation. We can see that, in continuous-time,
there is no need to find a proxy for ln (qz/pz), as Foote did in the implementation of
his regression, and which caused an increase in the uncertainty associated with the
estimation of the parameter associated with ln (E (JD) /E (JC)).
A third comment is that, in continuous-time, the coefficient of variation for job











We can also prove, using corollary 3, that the net growth rate of employment is just
equal to the trend growth rate, that is
E (NET ) = E (JC)−E (JD) = μ.
9Note that these expressions explain the result in table 1 of Caballero (1992). In fact, unless we
abandon the assumption of symmetric shocks, as he does in table 2, the coefficient of variation will
be identical for JC and JD.
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Therefore, in this model the net growth rate and the coefficient of variation for job
flows are sufficient to reveal important deep parameters characterizing the shocks
facing firms.
Before moving to the next section we should just mention that this model can be
realistically calibrated. We give a brief example. First note the dependence of the
parameters on the units of time ([T ]), cost ([$]) and length of adjustment ([L]) (see
Dixit 1991b): σ2 and σ2a are in [L]
2 [T ]−1, μ is in [L] [T ]−1, Cl and Cu are in [$], cl
and cu are in [$] [L]
−1, b is in [$] [L]−2 [T ]−1, and ρ is in [T ]−1. Given that z is in [L],
it can easily be proven that (L, l, u, U) are in [L] and that fc is in [L]
−1. We consider
[T ] to be one year, [$] to be dollars, and [L] to be units of percentage. Then, consider
the following calibration:
ρ = 0.02, μ = −3, σ2 = 100, σ2a = 9, b = 100, Cu = Cl = 1000, cu = cl = 100. (3.4)
We can interpret these values as follows: the annual discount factor is 0.98; the trend
growth rate of frictionless employment is −3% per year ; the volatility of optimal
employment corresponds to a standard deviation of 10% per year ; the contribution
of aggregate shocks to the uncertainty a firm faces is 30%; a gap between actual
and optimal employment of 10% for one year costs the firm $5, 000 of lost profits in
that year; the fixed cost of adjustment is symmetric and amounts to $1, 000; and the
proportional cost of adjustment is symmetric and amounts to $100 for each percentage
point variation in the number of workers.
With this calibration we would get L = −12.3597, l = −3.1014, u = 0.79212, U =
10.874. This means that, for example, the firm would only decide to hire new workers
if its employment level fell below the target by roughly 12%, and that such a firm
would increase the work force by roughly 9%. The job flows statistics implied by this
example would be E (JC) = 2.4, E (JD) = 5.4, std (JC) = 0.72, std (JD) = 1.62,
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std (JD) /std (JC) = 2.3. Therefore, this example would be consistent with Foote’s
argument that a negative trend growth rate causes firms to be concentrated near the
job destruction margin, causing a higher relative volatility of JD.
3.3 (S,s) Model with Structural Heterogeneity
We now extend the previous model to the case where there is heterogeneity among the
firms in a given sector. To simplify the analysis we consider the simplest case where
there are two types of firms, with p being the proportion of employment accounted
for by firms of type 1. We have in mind both the distinction of young versus old
firms and of small versus large firms. In the first case, the appropriate approach
would be to consider that the trend growth rate and the uncertainty vary smoothly
with the age of the firm. However, this would complicate the solution of the model,
by making the trigger and return points age-dependent. This model could only be
solved numerically. To avoid these complications, we consider that the discount rate
is high enough so that young and old firms can be considered to be facing different
structural parameters μ, σa, and σI (and, eventually, Cl, Cu, cl, and cu). Given this,
in proposition 4, we show that aggregate statistics are just a weighted average of type
specific statistics.10 Then, in corollary 5, we derive the general expression for the
correlation coefficient of job reallocation and net job growth.
Proposition 4 In the (S,s) model under consideration, when there are two types
of firms in a given sector, with p the fraction of sector employment accounted for by
firms of type 1, the aggregate job creation rate (E (JC)), the aggregate job destruction
rate (E (JD)), the standard deviation of aggregate job destruction (std (JD)), and the
standard deviation of aggregate job creation (std (JC)) are weighted averages of the
10Note that even though the standard deviations are also a weighted average of the type specific
standard deviations, the same does not occur with the variance, since Cov (JD1, JD2) 6= 0.
70
type-specific corresponding magnitudes, that is:
E (JC) = E (JC)1 p+E (JC)2 (1− p) ,
E (JD) = E (JD)1 p+E (JD)2 (1− p) ,
std (JD) = std (JD)1 p+ std (JD)2 (1− p) ,
std (JC) = std (JC)1 p+ std (JC)2 (1− p) .
Proof. See appendix B.2.
Corollary 5 In the (S,s) model under consideration, when there are two types of
firms in a given sector, with p the fraction of sector employment accounted for by



























































Proof. See appendix B.2.
Some comments on these results follow. First, from proposition 4, the mean and
standard deviation of aggregate gross job flows are employment-weighted averages of
the respective measures in each type of firm. Therefore, industries characterized by
larger shares of young and smaller firms will be characterized by larger rates of job
reallocation and by higher standard deviations of gross job creation and destruction.
























, that is, when the two types of firms have different degrees of
relative sensitivity to aggregate shocks. In particular, firm types that are relatively
more sensitive to aggregate uncertainty have disproportionate impact on both the
relative volatility of job destruction and creation and on the covariance between job
reallocation and net job creation. This latter covariance is composed of two parts,
one associated with Rea the other with Net, and in each component firms more
sensitive to aggregate shocks have weight disproportionate to its employment share.
In the next section, we analyze empirically how different firm types affect the two
components of Cov (Rea,Net), which we use as a summary measure of the cyclical
behavior of job flows.
3.4 Structural Heterogeneity and Job Flow Dy-
namics
In this section, we analyze the influence of different age and size classes of firms on
aggregate gross job flows dynamics. We useQuadros de Pessoal, a database containing
information on all Portuguese firms with paid employees. This is an administrative
dataset which collects information about the firm, its establishments and its workers.
All economic sectors except public administration are included. The panel we have
access to covers the period 1985-2000. Information refers to March through 1993,
and to October since the reformulation of the survey in 1994. On average the dataset
contains 250,000 firms, 300,000 establishments, and 2,500,000 workers in each year.
In the following, we consider the period 1987-1999, in order to minimize false entries
and exits.
In table 3.1, we present some properties of firm job flows for the overall economy
and for four one-digit sectors, manufacturing (Manu), transportation (Tran), services
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Table 3.1: Firms Job Flows: 1987-1999
Sector EmpSh JC JD Net NetC SD(JD)SD(JC) C(Net,Rea) C(JD, JC)
All 13.0 10.4 2.6 1.0 0.93 0.09 −0.59
Manu 40.3 10.2 9.9 0.2 −0.1 0.98 0.03 −0.68
Tran 7.5 7.5 7.3 0.2 −1.5 1.43 −0.55 0.84
Serv 18.0 17.2 10.8 6.4 3.0 0.57 0.56 −0.51
Reta 9.8 16.6 11.1 5.6 3.0 0.57 0.54 −0.38
Notes: EmpSh is the employment share (in %); JC and JD are the mean gross job
creation and job destruction rates (in %); Net and NetC are the net job creation
rate (in %) among all firms and among continuing firms, respectively; SD(JD) and
SD(JC) are the standard deviations of JD and JC ; C(Net,Rea) is the correlation
between Net and the rate of reallocation (JC + JD); C(JD, JC) is the correlation
between JD and JC.
(Serv) and retail trade (Reta).11 In general, gross job flows are quite large in all
sectors, but net job creation and the cyclical behavior of job flows vary significantly
across sectors. Consistent with Foote (1998), sectors with larger net job creation
(Serv and Reta) exhibit a larger relative volatility of job creation and more procyclical
reallocation.12
In table 3.2, we provide information on cross-sector differences in the age and
size composition of firms, and on the cyclical properties of gross job flows across age
and size classes. The dynamics of gross job flows over the business cycle are quite
distinct across firms of different age and size. Young firms, and to a lesser extent
small firms, grow faster and exhibit a larger relative volatility of job creation. More
importantly, for young and small firms, fluctuations in gross job flows tend to be
less determined by aggregate shocks, and more by idiosyncratic shocks as evidenced
by their relatively low coefficient of variation for job flows. This is consistent with a
theory of learning and growth, where firms in the first few years of life are learning and
11In order to obtain equivalent one-digit SIC87 sectors, we use the following correspondence in
terms of CAE Rev. 1 codes : manufacturing(= 3), transportation and public utilities(= 7 + 4),
services(= 6.3 + 8.3.2 + 8.3.3 + 9.2 + 9.3 + 9.4 + 9.5), and retail trade(= 6.2) .
12The positive value for the correlation between JC and JD for Tran can only be explained by
the dominance of old and large firms in this sector, most of them controlled by the state, at the
least for the largest part of the period under consideration. Therefore, we should be careful when
analyzing the results for this sector.
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Table 3.2: Sectoral Heterogeneity
Class
SD(JD)
SD(JC) NetC CV (JC) CV (JD) EmpSh
All All All All All Manu Tran Serv Reta
Size
[1− 3] 0.42 1.0 0.11 0.07 7.6 2.6 3.0 13.3 21.5
[4− 9] 0.35 2.1 0.15 0.08 13.7 7.6 4.7 20.5 29.5
[10− 24] 0.37 2.3 0.17 0.09 14.7 13.0 5.7 17.2 17.3
[25− 99] 0.62 1.9 0.16 0.12 22.5 28.1 10.1 19.4 15.7
[100− ·] 1.19 −0.2 0.19 0.23 41.5 48.7 76.5 29.6 16.0
Age
[0− 3] 0.38 9.2 0.10 0.13 8.0 6.0 2.7 10.8 11.3
[4− 9] 0.62 4.0 0.17 0.08 15.7 13.7 5.5 19.2 20.2
[10− 24] 0.68 1.3 0.13 0.07 25.0 24.9 8.5 29.7 31.8
[25− ·] 1.68 −1.4 0.20 0.20 51.3 55.4 83.3 40.3 36.7
Notes: SD(JC) and SD(JD) are the standard deviations of job creation (JC) and job
destruction (JD); NetC is the net job creation rate (in %) among continuing firms;
CV (JC) and CV (JD) are the coefficients of variation of JC and JD; EmpSh is the
employment share of each class (in %).
adjusting accordingly to their ex-post optimal scale. This suggests that the influence
of old and large firms on the cyclical variation of aggregate gross job flows is larger
than their influence on average aggregate gross job flows, which is already large given
their employment shares. Table 3.2 also shows that, because of technological and
institutional restrictions, the size and age distributions are quite different across the
four sectors. In particular, Tran and Manu have a larger proportion of old and large
firms, whereas Reta and Serv have a larger proportion of young and small firms. We
now analyze the impact of these differences on the cyclical properties of job flows in
each sector.
In order to apply the theoretical results in sections 3.2 and 3.3 in the empirical
analysis, we need to recognize that our measure of the relative sensitivity to aggregate
and idiosyncratic shocks depends on whether it is obtained from JC or from JD.
Therefore, we adopt the following strategy. We rewrite the two components of the
ratio of volatilities in (3.5) as a weighted sum of average JC and JD across all classes
of firms. Let n be the number of types of firms (i = 1, . . . , n). Then, we compute the
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Table 3.3: Overall Economy: Heterogeneity and Job Flow Dynamics
Class Net JD JC CV (JD) CV (JC) p wjd wjc
SD(JD)
SD(JC)
Size Relative Volatility: (0.93, 0.73)
[1− 3] 9.6 18.3 28.0 0.07 0.11 7.6 3.6 4.9 0.42
[4− 9] 6.9 13.3 20.2 0.08 0.15 13.7 7.2 12.0 0.35
[10− 24] 4.3 11.6 15.9 0.09 0.17 14.7 8.4 14.7 0.37
[25− 99] 2.1 9.8 11.9 0.12 0.16 22.5 18.1 21.2 0.62
[100− ·] −0.1 7.8 7.7 0.23 0.19 41.5 62.6 47.1 1.19
All 2.6 10.4 13.0 0.15 0.17 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.93
Age Relative Volatility: (0.83, 0.78)
[0− 3] 9.2 6.3 15.4 0.14 0.12 8.0 7.3 5.9 0.48
[4− 9] 4.0 7.6 11.6 0.11 0.17 15.7 10.8 15.3 0.43
[10− 24] 1.3 6.8 8.1 0.09 0.13 25.0 14.5 19.4 0.58
[25− ·] −1.4 6.6 5.2 0.21 0.20 51.3 67.4 59.5 1.34
All 1.0 6.6 7.6 0.16 0.17 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.83
Notes: For size classes values refer to all firms, whereas for age classes values refer to
continuing firms. JD, JC, and Net are the mean values of job destruction, job creation,
and net job creation (in %); CV (JD) and CV (JC) is the coefficient of variation of
JD and JC (see (3.7c) and (3.7d)); p is the employment share; wjd and wjc are the
weighted shares in JD and JC dynamics (see (3.7b)); SD(JD) and SD(JC) is the
standard deviation of JD and JC; in (z, y) z is the observed relative volatility of job
destruction, and y is a version of z corrected for sectoral heterogeneity.
two terms in (3.5) as follows
std (X) = CV (X)
Xn
i=1












CV (X)i pi, X = JD, JC, (3.7d)
where pi (
Pn
i=1 pi = 1) is the employment share of each class.
In tables 3.3 to 3.7, we analyze how each type of firm contributes to the relative
volatility of job destruction and job creation, both for the overall economy and for the
four sectors. For the overall economy, we see that young and small firms have larger
net job creation rates (column 2), and have a smaller relative sensitivity to aggregate
shocks (columns 5 and 6). This implies that in the determination of aggregate job
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flow dynamics old and large firms have a larger weight than what would be expected
from its (already large) employment share (compare column 7 with columns 8 and
9). Because young and small firms tend to have procyclical reallocation and large
and old firms tend to exhibit countercyclical reallocation (see column 10), then the
larger sensitivity of large and old firms to aggregate shocks implies that aggregate
reallocation activity is more countercyclical than what would be if firms were equally
sensitive to aggregate shocks. In rows 2 and 9 we show that if instead of using the
weights wJC,i and wJD,i we use the employment share of each type of firm, pi, then
the ratio of volatilities of job destruction and job creation decreases from 0.93 to 0.73
(size classes) and from 0.83 to 0.78 (age classes).13
The same analysis can be done at the one-digit sectoral level. To avoid repetition,
we stress the main cross-sector differences, and how they are determined by specific
heterogeneities in each sector. The results forManu are in table 3.4. Relative to other
sectors, Manu displays small differences in the relative sensitivity to aggregate shocks
in large/old firms versus small/young firms. Therefore, the employment share of each
class is close to its respective weight in job flow dynamics. However, there is an
interesting asymmetry for large manufacturing firms. Because they are more active
on the destruction margin, we have the interesting result wJD > p > wJC, which
implies that, for size classes, reallocation would be slightly more countercyclical if all
types were equally sensitive to aggregate shocks. For age classes, results are similar
to those of the overall economy.
Table 3.5 contains the results for Tran. This sector is dominated by old and large
firms with much larger relative sensitivities to aggregate shocks than young and small
13Note that for age classes we consider only job flows among continuing firms. We do this because
the job creation rate for the class [0− 3] years is very large, a consequence of the job creation due
to births. When all firms are considered, we obtain a completely different result: if all firms were
equally sensitive to aggregate shocks, aggregate job flows would be extremely procyclical. This fact
shows that even though job creation and job destruction rates are very large for the class [0 − 3],
their impact on aggregate job reallocation is limited because these flows are not very sensitive to
aggregate conditions.
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Table 3.4: Manufacturing: Heterogeneity and Job Flow Dynamics
Class Net JD JC CV (JD) CV (JC) p wjd wjc
SD(JD)
SD(JC)
Size Relative Volatility: (0.98, 1.01)
[1− 3] 9.1 18.6 27.7 0.07 0.15 2.6 1.0 2.0 0.31
[4− 9] 6.9 14.1 21.0 0.07 0.22 7.6 3.2 8.5 0.23
[10− 24] 3.6 12.0 15.6 0.11 0.26 13.0 8.3 17.6 0.33
[25− 99] 0.8 9.7 10.5 0.16 0.27 28.1 26.0 38.6 0.56
[100− ·] −2.1 8.2 6.1 0.22 0.13 48.7 61.5 33.3 2.23
Manu 0.2 9.9 10.2 0.18 0.20 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.98
Age Relative Volatility: (1.21, 1.02)
[0− 3] 11.5 4.9 16.4 0.20 0.16 6.0 6.1 5.0 0.38
[4− 9] 4.2 6.2 10.3 0.15 0.22 13.7 11.0 16.0 0.42
[10− 24] 1.0 5.7 6.7 0.15 0.19 24.9 19.8 25.6 0.67
[25− ·] −2.8 6.8 4.1 0.22 0.18 55.4 63.0 53.4 2.03
Manu −0.1 6.3 6.2 0.19 0.19 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.21
Notes: See table 3.3.
Table 3.5: Transportation: Heterogeneity and Job Flow Dynamics
Class Net JD JC CV (JD) CV (JC) p wjd wjc
SD(JD)
SD(JC)
Size Relative Volatility: (1.43, 0.87)
[1− 3] 13.7 16.0 29.7 0.08 0.10 3.0 0.3 0.4 0.44
[4− 9] 10.6 12.1 22.7 0.12 0.10 4.7 0.8 0.7 0.64
[10− 24] 6.2 10.7 16.8 0.20 0.13 5.7 1.5 1.1 1.00
[25− 99] 3.2 8.3 11.6 0.35 0.20 10.1 4.9 3.0 1.27
[100− ·] −1.7 6.4 4.6 0.88 0.84 76.5 92.4 94.8 1.44
Tran 0.2 7.3 7.5 0.73 0.68 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.43
Age Relative Volatility: (1.89, 1.51)
[0− 3] 13.7 4.9 18.6 0.21 0.14 2.7 0.9 0.8 0.40
[4− 9] 6.8 7.0 13.8 0.25 0.19 5.5 2.2 2.2 0.69
[10− 24] 4.4 6.5 10.9 0.25 0.21 8.5 3.3 3.7 0.72
[25− ·] −3.3 5.5 2.2 0.72 0.53 83.3 93.6 93.3 3.35
Tran −1.5 5.5 4.0 0.64 0.47 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.89
Notes: See table 3.3.
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Table 3.6: Services: Heterogeneity and Job Flow Dynamics
Class Net JD JC CV (JD) CV (JC) p wjd wjc
SD(JD)
SD(JC)
Size Relative Volatility: (0.57, 0.61)
[1− 3] 9.7 18.6 28.3 0.06 0.07 13.3 5.8 6.3 0.58
[4− 9] 6.9 12.7 19.6 0.09 0.10 20.5 12.6 13.6 0.58
[10− 24] 5.4 10.0 15.5 0.12 0.09 17.2 14.3 10.3 0.87
[25− 99] 6.1 8.4 14.5 0.10 0.12 19.4 13.4 14.6 0.51
[100− ·] 5.4 7.5 12.9 0.27 0.29 29.6 53.8 55.3 0.54
Serv 6.4 10.8 17.2 0.15 0.16 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.57
Age Relative Volatility: (0.57, 0.62)
[0− 3] 7.3 6.7 14.0 0.11 0.10 10.8 7.0 6.1 0.50
[4− 9] 4.1 8.0 12.1 0.11 0.18 19.2 12.7 18.7 0.41
[10− 24] 2.5 6.8 9.3 0.11 0.17 29.7 19.4 28.4 0.45
[25− ·] 1.9 6.0 7.9 0.25 0.21 40.3 60.8 46.8 0.90
Serv 3.0 6.6 9.6 0.17 0.18 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.57
Notes: See table 3.3.
firms.14 This is the sector where the difference in the sensitivity to aggregate shocks
between young/small firms and old/large firms is more pronounced. Therefore, job re-
allocation is much more countercyclical than would be expected from the employment
share of each class of firms.
Finally, tables 3.6 and 3.7 display the results for Serv and Reta. We combine
comments for these two sectors because their patterns are very similar. In both Serv
and Reta, large and old firms are relatively sensitive to aggregate shocks. However,
large and (to a lesser extent) old firms tend to exhibit high positive net job creation
rates. This implies that in these two sectors large and old firms have relatively low
values for the relative volatility of job destruction (except old firms in Serv). Then,
we have two competing effects: the smaller weight of young and small firms causes
them to contribute less to procyclical reallocation, but the larger weight of old and
large firms, which display strongly procyclical reallocation, causes them to contribute
more to procyclical reallocation. We conclude that procyclical reallocation activity
in these two sectors is associated with all classes of firms, so that a large relative
14As mentioned above, this might reflect the fact in Tran we find some large state owned firms.
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Table 3.7: Retail Trade: Heterogeneity and Job Flow Dynamics
Class Net JD JC CV (JD) CV (JC) p wjd wjc
SD(JD)
SD(JC)
Size Relative Volatility: (0.57, 0.71)
[1− 3] 7.8 16.5 24.4 0.07 0.13 21.5 10.8 19.1 0.36
[4− 9] 4.4 10.7 15.1 0.06 0.12 29.5 13.2 23.9 0.36
[10− 24] 3.4 9.4 12.9 0.07 0.10 17.3 9.1 11.4 0.54
[25− 99] 3.4 8.1 11.5 0.18 0.13 15.7 20.2 14.0 0.94
[100− ·] 8.9 8.3 17.2 0.41 0.30 16.0 46.7 31.5 0.66
Reta 5.6 11.1 16.6 0.14 0.15 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.57
Age Relative Volatility: (0.36, 0.53)
[0− 3] 7.2 5.3 12.5 0.12 0.12 11.3 10.2 8.2 0.42
[4− 9] 3.7 6.9 10.6 0.10 0.14 20.2 15.6 17.0 0.47
[10− 24] 1.4 6.5 7.9 0.10 0.12 31.8 22.9 22.0 0.68
[25− ·] 2.9 6.2 9.1 0.19 0.24 36.7 51.2 52.9 0.52
Reta 3.0 6.2 9.2 0.13 0.17 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.36
Notes: See table 3.3.
sensitivity to aggregate shocks in old and large firms does not significantly change
the dynamics of the job reallocation in the sector.
To put the above sectoral analysis into context, we should mention that during
the period 1986 to 2000, the sectoral employment shares evolved as follows: Manu
decreased from 45.8% to 32.7%; Tran decreased from 9.2% to 6.6%; Serv increased
from 14.0% to 24.2%; and Reta increased from 7.9% to 11.5%. Manu was subject
to a large structural change mainly due to international competition. Because this
process should be somehow independent of business cycles, the job reallocation of
old and large firms was less cyclically sensitive than in other circumstances. In Serv,
and especially in Reta, the opposite occurred with the expansion of existing and the
creation of new industries. The scale and the first-mover advantages seem to have
been important factors for success in these sectors, such as telecommunications and
the big retail segment.
79
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we analyze to what extent structural heterogeneity among firms
can affect the dynamic behavior of aggregate job flows. We use an (S,s) model
of employment adjustment, and derive continuous-time expressions for gross flows
statistics. We extend the model by considering two types of firms and derive the
impact of each type on the cyclical behavior of job reallocation. We then analyze
cyclical properties of job reallocation in the Portuguese economy, considering the
overall economy, and the manufacturing, transportation, services, and retail trade
sectors. In general, the impact of old and large firms on aggregate job flow dynamics
is larger than what should be expected from their employment share. This occurs
because old and large firms tend to be affected relatively more by aggregate shocks
than young and small firms. This higher relative sensitivity to aggregate shocks tends
to decrease the procyclicality of job reallocation in all sectors (except in retail trade
and services for specific reasons). However, we find a larger effect in transportation
than in other sectors. In manufacturing the structural differences between the two
types of firms are smaller than in other sectors. In services and retail trade, old and
large firms have large procyclical job reallocation rates, contrary to what occurs in
other sectors.
The detailed analysis in this chapter enables us to realize that aggregate job flow
dynamics are substantially affected by sector-specific technological and institutional
factors that determine how the age and size distribution of firms evolves. Notwith-
standing this, the analysis makes it clear that old and large firms are more important




Gross Job Flows in Portugal
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we study regularities of gross job flows for the Portuguese econ-
omy. We use Quadros de Pessoal (QP), a Portuguese longitudinal employer-employee
matched with annual data covering the period 1985-2000.1 The main findings are
consistent with those of other studies: high rates of gross job flows; wide disparity
of results across different sectors; industries with positive trend growth rates tend to
exhibit procyclical reallocation; different age and size classes of firms display quite
different patterns of gross job flows. We contribute to the literature by providing a
detailed analysis of gross job flows in Portugal by economic sector and age and size
classes. Previous studies, such as Blanchard and Portugal (2001), only contained
information for manufacturing and no analysis of heterogeneity across age and size
classes.
1The structure of this database is described in appendix C.1.
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4.2 Reallocation of Jobs in Portugal
4.2.1 Macroeconomic Performance
We start with basic institutional and macroeconomic facts about the Portuguese econ-
omy. During the period 1985-2000, Portugal went through a modernization process in
infrastructures and market regulations. Having joined the European Union in 1986,
jointly with Spain, Portugal benefited, to a great extent for free, from an enormous
amount of funds to invest in infrastructure. Simultaneously, until the mid 1990s, Por-
tugal had to adopt reforms to enhance competition and liberalize financial markets,
in the process leading to the creation of an economic union in Europe. Additionally,
in the late 1980s and early 1990s there was a significant amount of privatizations,
especially of big public utilities. In this restructuring process, some traditional manu-
facturing sectors, like textiles, suffered considerably while new opportunities emerged,
especially in the services sector.
The macroeconomic performance during this period is summarized in figure 4.1,
where we plot the real growth rate of GDP, the unemployment rate, and the net
job growth rate (Net). This picture shows that Net matches quite closely real GDP
growth, and that the unemployment rate responds (countercyclically) with a lag of
about one year. In terms of business cycles, the late 1980s is a period of high growth
with a declining unemployment rate. This expansion is then followed by a recession,
which starts in 1990 and hits the bottom in 1993. However, the ensuing mild recovery
was not so successful in terms of net job creation.
4.2.2 Gross Job Flows by Sector
With this business cycle information as background, we now move to the analysis
of gross job flows. We use Quadros de Pessoal, an administrative database on all
Portuguese firms with paid employees. We describe in more detail this database in
82
year
 NETEc  GDPcp growth rate
 Unempl. rate
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Figure 4.1: Portuguese Macroeconomic Performance
appendix C.1, but it is the same database used in Blanchard and Portugal (2001). We
also discuss methodological questions associated with the measurement of gross job
flows in appendix C.2. We have considered gross job flows for firms, for establishments
and for establishments with at least five employees (the U.S. standard in the LRD),
which account for about 90% of all jobs. The greatest difference across the three
data categorizations occurs between the statistics for firms and for establishments,
especially in terms of levels, but not so much in terms of covariation.
In tables 4.1 and 4.2, we present job flows statistics for establishments and firms,
respectively. The values for gross job flows are comparable to other international
evidence, such as Davis et al. (1996) and Baldwin, Dunne and Haltiwanger (1998).
Average gross job creation and job destruction are large, and the contribution of births
and deaths to gross job flows is also large. The fact that the values for job reallocation
are larger than the average values presented in Blanchard and Portugal (2001) are
due to the fact that those authors consider only the Portuguese manufacturing sector.
We can see that both job creation and job destruction react in predictable ways to
the business cycle and with a time profile that is consistent with figure 4.1. Job
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Table 4.1: Establishment Level Job Flows
Ano JCC JC JDC JD Net Rea ERea
1987 8.1 14.1 6.3 10.6 3.5 24.6 21.2
1988 8.9 15.7 6.0 10.3 5.5 26.0 20.5
1989 9.1 16.0 7.0 10.9 5.1 26.9 21.8
1990 8.6 14.0 7.6 11.9 2.1 25.8 23.7
1991 9.0 17.0 8.2 13.3 3.7 30.3 26.7
1992 7.7 13.5 8.6 12.1 1.4 25.5 24.1
1993 6.8 12.6 10.1 14.9 −2.3 27.5 25.3
1994 5.7 12.4 7.0 12.4 0.0 24.8 24.8
1995 7.8 13.0 8.2 12.3 0.7 25.3 24.6
1996 8.1 13.2 7.7 11.7 1.5 24.9 23.5
1997 8.9 14.6 7.3 11.2 3.3 25.8 22.4
1998 9.0 14.7 7.2 11.7 2.9 26.4 23.5
1999 8.7 14.6 7.8 12.2 2.4 26.8 24.4
Notes: JC and JD are the rates of job creation and job destruction among all
units; JCC and JDC are the rates of job creation and job destruction among
continuing units; Net(= JC−JD) is the net job creation rate; Rea(= JC+JD)
is the job reallocation rate; ERea(= Rea− |Net|) is the excess job reallocation
rate. All rates are in %.
reallocation is also mostly due to excess reallocation, and only a small part is due to
trend growth rate.
In table 4.3, we analyze firm level gross job flows in some one-digit sectors. We
consider manufacturing (Manu), services (Serv), retail trade (Reta), construction
(Cons), wholesale trade (Whol), and transportation and public utilities (Tran).2 In
the process of calculating job flows by economic sector, we had to face a change in the
sector classification system in 1995. In appendix C.2, we describe the methodology
used to harmonize the two CAE codes.
For the overall economy, even though the average net job growth rate is signif-
icantly positive, reallocation is only slightly procyclical. This result is not entirely
consistent with the prediction of Foote (1998), but it can be explained by the larger
relative sensitivity to aggregate shocks by old and large firms, as was the case in the
previous chapter. Now we discuss the results for the one-digit sectors. As evidence of
2In order to obtain equivalent one-digit SIC87 sectors, we use the following correspondence
in terms of CAE Rev. 1 codes : Manu(= 3), Serv(= 6.3 + 8.3.2 + 8.3.3 + 9.2 + 9.3 + 9.4 + 9.5),
Reta(= 6.2), Cons(= 5), Whol(= 6.1), and Tran(= 7 + 4).
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Table 4.2: Firm Level Job Flows
Ano JCC JC JDC JD Net Rea ERea
1987 6.9 12.3 5.1 8.9 3.4 21.2 17.8
1988 8.0 14.3 5.3 9.0 5.3 23.2 17.9
1989 8.4 15.2 5.6 8.7 6.5 23.9 17.4
1990 7.6 13.1 6.4 10.1 2.9 23.2 20.2
1991 7.5 13.7 7.5 11.1 2.5 24.8 22.2
1992 6.9 12.1 7.3 10.8 1.3 22.9 21.7
1993 5.9 11.2 8.9 13.1 −1.9 24.4 22.5
1994 5.2 11.3 6.8 11.1 0.2 22.4 22.1
1995 7.2 11.9 6.9 10.8 1.1 22.7 21.5
1996 7.8 12.3 6.9 10.6 1.6 22.9 21.2
1997 9.1 13.9 6.4 9.9 4.1 23.8 19.8
1998 9.1 14.4 6.5 10.6 3.8 25.0 21.2
1999 9.0 13.9 6.7 11.0 2.9 25.0 22.1
Notes: See table 4.1.
Table 4.3: Firm Level Job Flows by Sector
Sector ESh87 ESh99 JC JD Net Rea CRea,Net CNets,Net
All 13.0 10.4 2.6 23.5 0.09
Manu 45.7 34.1 10.2 9.9 0.2 20.1 0.03 0.93
Serv 14.2 23.2 17.2 10.8 6.4 28.0 0.56 0.78
Reta 8.1 11.4 16.6 11.1 5.6 27.7 0.54 0.65
Cons 8.2 10.5 18.4 14.1 4.3 32.5 0.83 0.89
Whol 7.7 7.7 13.8 10.6 3.2 24.3 −0.12 0.88
Tran 9.0 6.6 7.5 7.3 0.2 14.8 −0.55 0.81
Notes: ESh87 and ESh99 are the employment shares (in %) of each sector in 1987 and
1999; Cx,y is the correlation coefficient between x and y; Nets is the net job creation
rate (in %) at the sectoral level; for all other variables see table 4.1.
the structural changes that occurred in the Portuguese economy during this period,
we can see that Manu has suffered a large decline in its employment share, whereas
Serv and Reta have registered a significant increase. This is reflected in the much
larger net job creation rates for the last two sectors. In general, reallocation tends to
be more procyclical in sectors with higher growth rates, suggesting that trend related
reallocation increases with the absolute value of trend.
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4.2.3 Gross Job Flows by Age and Size Classes
We have also obtained gross job flows by age and size classes. In order to avoid
repetition, we comment on the information in tables 3.2 and 3.3 in the previous
chapter. Heterogeneity across age and size classes is very significant. Young and
small firms have higher rates of job creation and job destruction, accounting for a
significant fraction of all job creation and all job destruction, and have larger net
growth rates (both among all units and among continuing units). It follows that
young and small firms tend to display procyclical reallocation, whereas old and large
firms tend to have countercyclical reallocation.
4.3 Conclusion
In this chapter we have provided evidence on the macroeconomic performance of
the Portuguese economy during the period form 1985 to 2000 and have analyzed
the cyclical behavior of gross job flows. The evidence is similar to studies in other
countries. We have also analyzed gross job flows across one-digit SIC87 sectors and
across age and size classes. We observe significant differences both across sectors,
especially between manufacturing and services, and across age and size classes. This




This dissertation analyzes some heterogeneities in patterns of gross job flows across
different classes of firms, defined by age and size. We now summarize the main con-
tributions that are made to the literature on job reallocation and industry dynamics.
First, we propose a measure that decomposes changes in the average size of a cohort
of entering firms into growth of survivors and exit of small firms. This is a useful
instrument to empirically distinguish theories that attempt to explain firm growth.
Second, we propose a mechanism for growth that relies on linear and nonconvex ad-
justment costs and decreasing idiosyncratic uncertainty with age due to a process of
learning. This gives incentives for firms to be cautious by entering small and adjusting
upwards if they survive and are efficient. Third, we show that firms whose optimal
employment is determined relatively more by aggregate shocks than by idiosyncratic
shocks affect the dynamics of aggregate job flows by more than they affect average
job flows. Fourth, we measure the impact of heterogeneity along the age and size
dimensions in Portuguese data, and conclude that old and large firms tend to make
reallocation less procyclical than what their employment shares would indicate. Fi-
nally, we produce an updated account of business cycle behavior of gross job flows in
Portugal.
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These contributions open further questions that deserve to be analyzed in future
work. We discuss some of these questions for chapters 2 and 3. In chapter 2, one desir-
able extension is the formal estimation of the adjustment cost parameters, especially
if we can do it for different sectors, such as manufacturing and services. The even-
tual cross-sector differences in the estimates would reinforce our argument. Another
extension is to build a model with both adjustment costs and financing constraints.
In this case, the firm is not interested in borrowing as much money as it can, and
adjustment costs might make it more costly to default. It would also be interesting to
analyze empirically the importance of these two arguments for firm growth. We could
do it using balance sheet information on the weight of debt among entering firms and
among continuing firms. Sectors where entering firms have the same weight of debt as
existing firms should not be subject to financing constraints, whereas sectors where
entering firms are less indebted than existing firms might be an indication of financing
constraints. In this dissertation we have explored the cross-industry evidence on firm
dynamics. However, there is also evidence of significant cross-country differences in
firms dynamics, even for tightly defined industries. This is an indication that both
technological and institutional factors matter for firms dynamics, eventually because
they reflect themselves in different structures of adjustment costs.
In chapter 3, we have concluded that the sensitivity of firms with respect to
aggregate versus idiosyncratic shocks is an important element in the heterogeneous
dynamic behavior of job flows between young and small firms, on the one hand,
and old and large firms, on the other hand. Therefore, we should build a model
that simultaneously explains the larger volatility of gross job flows and the smaller
relative sensitivity to aggregate shocks among young and small firms. We believe that
a model with observable aggregate shocks, linear adjustment costs, and some element
of learning about efficiency will lead to that result.
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Appendix A
Appendices for Chapter 2
A.1 Appendix: Proofs




can be summarized by (θ∗τ , τ), and the distribution
function F
¡
θ∗τ+1 | θ∗τ , τ) is a continuous and strictly decreasing function of θ∗τ .
Proof. From (2.2) we have
θ∗τ = g (Yτ , τ) = E (ξ (ητ) | Yτ , τ) = ν1 +
Z ∞
−∞
[1− Fη (ητ | Yτ , τ)] dξ (ητ) ,
where Fη (· | Yτ , τ) is the posterior distribution of ητ . Because Fη (ητ | Yτ , τ) is con-
tinuous and strictly decreasing in Yτ , and ξ (ητ) is strictly increasing in ητ , we con-
clude that g (Yτ , τ) is continuous and strictly increasing in Yτ (see theorem 3.4.1 in





{Yτ , τ} ≡ {θ∗τ , τ}, since Yτ = g−1Y (θ∗τ , τ), where g−1Y is the inverse function of g with









the conditional distribution of θ∗τ+1 can be represented as
F
¡
















τ , τ) | g−1Y (θ∗τ , τ) , τ
¸
,
since we need to integrate the density of ητ over the domain where g (Yτ+1, τ + 1) ≤
θ∗τ+1. From this, we conclude that F
¡
θ∗τ+1 | θ∗τ , τ
¢
is a continuous and strictly decreas-
ing function of θ∗τ . Therefore, the transition function associated with F
¡
θ∗τ+1 | θ∗τ , τ
¢
is monotone and satisfies the Feller property (see pp. 376-9 in Stokey, Lucas and
Prescott 1989).
Proof of proposition 4. We use the following notation: (i) X ≡ R+×Θ×N0 and
x ≡ (L, θ, τ) ∈ X, where Θ ≡ [ν1, ν2] ⊂ R+, ν1 ≥ 0, ν2 < ∞; (ii) T is the operator




















θ∗τ+1 | θ∗τ , τ
¢
;
(iv) V SO , V
SD
O , and V
SU
O denote the objective functions associated with V
S, V SD, and
V SU , that is, for j = S, SD, SU
V jO (Lτ ;Lτ−1, θ
∗
τ , τ) = Π (Lτ , θ
∗






τ , τ) .
We prove the proposition in various steps.
(a.i) Existence and Uniqueness: This part is similar to the case without linear
and nonconvex costs (see Jovanovic 1982)
(a.ii) Continuity in (Lτ−1, θ∗τ): Because the objective function in (2.4), V SO (Lτ ;
Lτ−1, θ
∗
τ , τ), is not continuous the usual argument is slightly modified. Let C12 (X)
be the space of bounded functions on X which are continuous in (Lτ−1, θ
∗
τ). This is
clearly a closed subset of B (X), the space of bounded functions V S : X → R. Since
B (X) with the sup norm
°°V S°° = supx∈X ¯̄V S (x)¯̄ is a Banach space, then C12 (X)
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is also a Banach space. Now consider V S ∈ C12 (X). Because max
©





θ∗τ−1 | θ∗τ , τ
¢
satisfies the Feller property (see lemma 2), thenMV S
is continuous in (Lτ , θ
∗








O (Lτ ;Lτ−1, θ
∗
τ , τ) and V
SU
O (Lτ ;Lτ−1, θ
∗
τ , τ) are
continuous in (Lτ ;Lτ−1, θ
∗
τ). Therefore, applying the maximum theorem, we conclude
that V SD (Lτ−1, θ∗τ , τ) and V
SU (Lτ−1, θ
∗




set of admissible values for employment is naturally compact. For V SU we can make
it compact by choosing a value for Lτ high enough, say LUB, such that LSU∗τ (Lτ−1,
θ∗τ , τ) ≤ LUB, for all Lτ−1 ≤ LUB, so that all values of interest are considered. LUB
is finite since F 0 (∞) = 0, and MV S is bounded. Therefore, V S as defined by (2.4) is
continuous in (Lτ−1, θ
∗
τ).
(a.iii) Strict Monotonicity in θ∗τ : From lemma 2 (the transition function associ-
ated with F
¡




τ+1, τ + 1
¢







τ , τ) is also weakly increasing in θ
∗
τ . Then, because Π (Lτ , θ
∗
τ)






is strictly increasing in θ∗τ (see corollary 3.1 in Stokey et al. 1989).
(b) Exit Policy: The exit policy is determined by the condition
V EX (Lτ−1) ≡ V S (Lτ−1, θ∗τ , τ) .
Because, for each Lτ−1, V EX is constant and V S is strictly increasing in θ
∗
τ , then it
is obvious that θEX (Lτ−1, τ) is a unique function defined by the value of θ∗ ∈ [ν1, ν2]
that satisfies the above equation, if it exists, or by ν1, when V EX (L) < V S (L, ν1, τ),
or by ν2, when V EX (L) > V S (L, ν2, τ). Because both V EX and V S are continuous
functions, then θEX is also a continuous function in L.
Proposition 5 Let T̄ be the maximum allowed age, so that a firm entering in period
0 must exit the industry at the end of period T̄ . Then Pr
¡
θ∗τ+1 ∈ ΘDT̄ (Lτ , τ + 1) |
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θ∗τ , τ) = 1, for all Lτ ∈ R+, τ ∈
©
0, . . . , T̄ − 1
ª
, where
ΘDT̄ (Lτ , τ + 1) =
©




τ+1, τ + 1
¢
is differentiable at Lτ
ª
.





differentiable in L, and all optima are interior in the region of their definition.1










Π (LT̄ , θ
∗
T̄ )− CS (LT̄ , LT̄−1) + βV EX (LT̄ )
ª
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are continuously differentiable functions of LT̄ , LT̄−1,






































= pF 0 (LT̄−1) θ
∗
T̄ − w − βPEX .







is continuously differentiable at LT̄−1 ∈ R+, with
probability one (given F
¡
· | θ∗T̄−1, T̄ − 1
¢
and for all θT̄−1 ∈ Θ).
Now consider a generic period τ ∈
©
1, . . . , T̄ − 1
ª











is a unique continuous function of L, we can apply the dominated con-







τ , τ) is continuously differentiable at
Lτ , for all θ
∗
τ ∈ Θ (see theorems 3.2.16 and 3.4.3 in Swartz 1994). Consequently, the
1A similar result would hold for the case of infinite-lived firms that face a finite learning horizon,
as in sections 2.4 and 2.5. However, in this case we would need to use proposition 11 first.
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same argument used for period T̄ can be repeated here.
Proof of proposition 6. For given (Lτ−1, τ) we partition the state-space associated
with θ∗τ , Θ, into regions of exit, Θ
EX , downward adjustment, ΘSD, non-adjustment,
ΘSN , and upward adjustment, ΘSU :2
ΘEX (Lτ−1, τ) =
©
θ : V EX > V S
ª
,
ΘSD (Lτ−1, τ) =
©
θ ∈ Θ : V SD > V SN , V SD ≥ V SU , V SD ≥ V EX
ª
,
ΘSN (Lτ−1, τ) =
©
θ ∈ Θ : V SN ≥ V SD, V SN ≥ V SU , V SN ≥ V EX
ª
,
ΘSU (Lτ−1, τ) =
©
θ ∈ Θ : V SU > V SN , V SU ≥ V SD, V SU ≥ V EX
ª
.
If it is optimal for the firm to adjust upwards, then we must solve
ASU =
£
















and if it is optimal for the firm to adjust downwards, we must solve
ASD =
£



























































θ∗τ+1 | θ∗τ , τ
¢
,
where some of the regions might be empty, and in separating the integrals we have
taken into account the continuity of the integrand at the frontiers.
2In ΘSD and ΘSU we need to use V SD > V SU and V SU > V SD because V S is not concave in
L.
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where we have used the fact that ASU = 0, when it is optimal to adjust upwards, and



















































s−1 ©χ̃∗τ+s ¡−PEX¢+ χ̂∗τ+s £pF 0 ¡L∗τ+s¢ θ∗τ+s − w¤ª ,
The result now follows by plugging this expression in ASU , and ASD.
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Proof of corollary 7. We can rewrite the LHS of (2.6) and (2.7) as follows
MB (Lτ−1, θ
∗
τ , τ) = (pF
0 (L∗τ) θ
∗




















































τ+1, then we get the stated result.
Proof of proposition 8. With proportional adjustment costs, optimal employment
at entry is determined by
















[pF 0 (L1) θ
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2 − w]− βT̄−1PF
o
dF (θ∗2 | θ∗1) +
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= 0
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)
where ψ (L) = −F 0 (L) / (LF 00 (L)) > 0 and ∂p/∂PH
p
> 0. If F (L) = ALα, we have
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We need PF < w
1−β , under the assumption that marginal utility is always positive,
since otherwise the firm would prefer to pay the worker, instead of firing him. If
F (L) = ALα, we have F 0/ (LF 00) = (α− 1)−1. Therefore, the indirect effects cancel












































which is positive for all T̄ .
Proof of proposition 9. With fixed adjustment costs, optimal employment at
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entry is determined by
pF 0 (L1) θ
∗







[pF 0 (L1) θ
∗
2 − w] dF (θ∗2 | θ∗1) = 0,
exactly the same as without those costs. With fixed costs we do not consider the
indirect effects that operate through changes in the equilibrium price, but once again
they should be of second-order magnitude.
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pF 0 (L1) θ
SU − w
p [F (L∗SU2 )− F (L∗1)]
.
From this we conclude that ∂L∗1/∂F
H > 0, and ∂θSU/∂FH > 0. Therefore, the
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p [F (L∗SD2 )− F (L∗1)]
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pF 0 (L1) θ
SD − w
p [F (L∗SD2 )− F (L∗1)]
.
From this we conclude that ∂L∗1/∂F
F < 0, and ∂θSD/∂FF < 0. Therefore, the


































Proof of proposition 10. The result concerning the posterior distribution of θτ+j
follows directly from
ln (θτ+j) |Ωτ= μ |Ωτ +ετ+j, μ |Ωτ∼ N (Yτ , Zτ ) .
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For the distribution of θ∗τ+j conditional on (θ
∗




















Zτ+j = Zτ − σ−2Zτ+jZτj,
ηs |Ωτ∼ N
¡
Yτ , Zτ + σ
2
¢
, Cov (ηs, ηs0 | Ωτ) = V ar (μ | Ωτ) = Zτ , s, s0 ≥ τ , s 6= s0

























= Zτ − Zτ+j.





For the unconditional distribution, just note that ln (θ∗τ) is a sum of normal random
variables, and that







V ar [ln (θ∗τ)] = σ
2
μ0
+ (Z0 − Zτ )
Proof of proposition 11.
After period T − 1 the optimization problem is time invariant, since there is no
uncertainty concerning E (θ). Therefore, for periods s, s ≥ 0, we have












W − CEX (Lτ+s)
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Consider a firm that is in the industry at time s, s ≥ 0. We now prove that this
firm will not change its employment level in period s+ 1. For this, we use the easily




S (L∗s, Ls−1) ≥ CS (Ls+1, Ls−1) ,
where L∗s = Ls (θ
∗
T , Ls−1, T ). We then have
Π (Ls+1, θ
∗
T )− CS (Ls+1, L∗s) + βmax
©
V EX (Ls+1) , V
S (θ∗T , Ls+1)
ª












V EX (Ls+1) , V
S (θ∗T , Ls+1)
ª
+ CS (L∗s, Ls−1)
≤ Π (Ls+1, θ∗T )− CS (Ls+1, Ls−1) + βmax
©
V EX (Ls+1) , V




≤ V S (θ∗T , Ls−1) + CS (L∗s, Ls−1)
= Π (L∗s, θ
∗
T )− CS (L∗s, Ls−1) + βmax
©
V EX (L∗s) , V




+ CS (L∗s, Ls−1)
= V SN (θ∗T , L
∗
s) .
Therefore, at time s+ 1 it is optimal to set L∗s+1 = L
∗
s.
We now give conditions under which the firm does not exit at time s + 1 after











. Now assume that in period s + 1 the firm exits, so
that
V S (θ∗T , L
∗
s, T ) < V














+ βV EX (L∗s)








For s ≥ 1, this is a contradiction. For s = 0, we can have L∗T 6= L∗T−1. In order to
exclude that possibility for s = 0, we must have











If L∗s ≥ L∗s−1 this inequality holds. If L∗s < L∗s−1 this inequality is equivalent to
P SD ≥ PEX − FSD 1
L∗s−1 − L∗s
.
Therefore, for s = 0 and for all L∗s−1, we must have P
SD ≥ PEX . This means that it
must be at least as expensive to fire workers while in the industry than to fire them
when exiting from the industry.
Proposition 12 The model of learning with adjustment costs can be equivalently
formulated, such that instead of an exit opportunity cost we have a per period operating
cost.
Proof. In order to simplify on notation, we omit any adjustment costs. The formu-
lation with adjustment costs is the following
V S (θ∗τ , τ) = max
Lτ
©
Π (Lτ , θ
∗




θ∗τ+1, τ + 1
¢ªª
.
Now let Ṽ S (·) = V S −W . Then, it is easily seen that we can write
Ṽ S (θ∗τ , τ) = max
Lτ
n
Π (Lτ , θ
∗












A.2 Appendix: Computational Algorithm
We present in various steps the algorithm we use to solve the finite learning horizon
model.
(i) Discretization and transition probability matrices associated with θ∗:
We discretize θ∗ based on a uniform discrete approximation to the (cross-section)












. We then em-
ploy the method of Tauchen (1986) to build the transition matrices associated
with this discrete approximation, using Gauss-Legendre quadrature for numer-
ical integration. We use a grid with 25 points.
(ii) Discretization of L
From the decision rules for problem (2.12) in case of hiring and in case of firing,
we consider
























For the mean of ln (L) we assume that if a firm is at the upper end of the grid
for L, then it should optimally decrease employment even at θNθ , and that if
a firm is at the lower end of the grid for L, then it should optimally increase
employment and exit next period, even at θ1. We then find the upper and
lower end of the grid for L such that those decisions occur, and use the same
procedure to discretize L as the one used for θ, considering 200 gridpoints.
(iii) Choice for T
We choose T = 15, and display results until period 10.
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(iv) Updating rule for p
In the sensitivity analysis of table 2.5 while changing each parameter we de-




− I = W . The updating
rule for p is based on problem (2.12) when we consider CEN instead of CS. We
apply
pi+1 = pi +













where x is changed in each iteration in order to improve the approximation. On
average, about 6 iterations are needed for convergence.
(v) Basic densities:
The first result contains recursive expressions to compute all relevant densities
and moments in the model
Proposition 13 Consider a generic period τ , and let NEτ−1 represent the
event that a firm has survived through period τ − 1, and it has not decided yet
if it will remain in period τ , and let NEτ−1 represent the event that a firm will
















: θ∗0 ≥ θEX0 , θ∗1 ≥ θEX1 (L0) , . . . ,




where NEτ−1 = NEτ−2 ∩NEτ−1. Then, for τ ≥ 2
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and the integrand in the numerator can be computed as
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(vii) Decomposition densities:
We define Sτ = NEτ = NEτ−1 ∩ NEτ , Dτ = NEτ−1 ∩gNEτ , where Ã is the
complement of A, and Dτ = ∪τs=1Ds. Then,





τ , Lτ−1)] f (θ
∗
τ , Lτ−1 | NEτ−1)P
NEτ
f (θ∗τ , Lτ−1 | NEτ−1)
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where for τ ≥ 1
f (θ∗0 | NEτ) =
£P
NEτ
f (θ∗τ , Lτ−1 | NEτ−1, θ∗0)
¤
f (θ∗0 | NEτ−1)P
NEτ
f (θ∗τ , Lτ−1 | NEτ−1)
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E [ln (L0) | Dτ ] =
1
Pr (Dτ | S0)
{E [ln (L0) | S0]− Pr (Sτ | S0)E [ln (L0) | Sτ ]}
(viii) Weighted moments:
Let Eω represent an employment weighted moment. Then, as an example,
we compute the employment weighted mean of log-employment conditional on
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survival as






E [Lτ | NEτ ]
ln (L∗τ (θ
∗
τ , Lτ−1)) f (θ
∗
τ , Lτ−1 | NEτ) .
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Appendix B
Appendices for Chapter 3
B.1 Appendix: Impulse Control of Brownian Mo-
tion
In this appendix, we present some technical details underlying the results in sections
3.2 and 3.3 of chapter 3.1 An agent wants to control some stock variable, x, so that it
is as near as possible to its optimal frictionless value, x∗. The stochastic law governing
the evolution of x∗ is characterized by an arithmetic Brownian motion process with
drift μ and standard deviation σ, that is,
dx∗t = μdt+ σdwt,
where wt is a Wiener process. A Wiener process, also called a standardized Brown-
ian motion, is a continuous-time stochastic process whose increment, dwt, follows a
normal distribution with zero mean and variance dt. Therefore, the Brownian motion
process x∗t has increments, dx
∗
t , over the infinitesimal time interval, dt, which follow
a normal distribution with mean μdt and variance σ2dt.
1The references are Cox and Miller (1965), Harrison et al. (1983), Harrison (1985), Bertola and
Caballero (1990), Dixit (1991b, 1991a, 1993), and Stokey (2003).
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Because it is costly to exert control over xt, in general, it will not be optimal for
the agent to make xt coincide with x∗t at every point in time. Instead, he will try to
make xt as close as possible to x∗t , so that the benefits of closely following x
∗
t balance
the costs of doing so. In the (S,s) model under consideration there are both fixed and
proportional adjustment costs, that is
C (dxt) = (Cl + cldxt)1 (dxt > 0) + (Cu − cudxt)1 (dxt < 0) ,
where 1 (·) stands for the indicator function.
Following Bertola and Caballero (1990), define zt = xt − x∗t as the excess of
current stock over the frictionless optimal stock, and assume that the agent chooses
an optimal path for zt in order to minimize the expected present value of the lost
profits due to the presence of adjustment costs. The stochastic process of z can be
specified as follows
dzt = dxt − dx∗t = −μdt+ σdwt + dlt − dut,
where {lτ}, {uτ} denote the cumulative upward and downward adjustment on zt up
to time τ .2 Let the sets of indexes associated with moments in time where there is ad-
justment be {υ ∈ N : duτυ > 0, τυ > t}, {λ ∈ N : dlτλ > 0, τλ > t}. If f (zτ ) denotes
the instantaneous current value of lost profits due to zτ 6= 0, then the optimization
problem faced by the firm can be represented by:





e−ρ(τ−t)f (zτ) dτ +
Z ∞
t







e−ρ(τλ−t)Cl | zt = z
¾
(B.1)
2Note that, in the absence of adjustment, z follows a Brownian motion process with drift −μ
and standard deviation σ.
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The solution to this problem was shown by Harrison et al. (1983) to be character-
ized by four parameters (L, l, u, U), where L is the lower trigger point, l is the lower
return point, U is the upper trigger point and u is the upper return point. This means
that there is an inaction region between L and U , and that whenever z hits L the
stock is increased by ∆xt = l − L > 0, and whenever z hits U the stock is decreased




σ2V 00 (z)− μV 0 (z)− ρV (z) + f (z) = 0. (B.2)
For a given specification of f , the solution to this second-order ordinary differential
equation is the difference of two components: the first is the present discounted value
of lost profits in the absence of any control over z, and the second is the present
discounted value of the reduction in lost profits, minus adjustment costs, due to
control.
As shown in Dixit (1993), an analytical solution to V can be found when f is as-
sumed to be a polynomial in zτ . When f (zτ ) = b2z
2
τ , treating (B.1) as a maximization
problem, the solution to (B.2) is given by























The two unknown constants in the solution to the differential equation and the precise
values of (L, l, u, U) are found by solving the following system of equations
V (l)− V (L) = Cl + cl (l − L) , V (u)− V (U) = Cu + cu (U − u) ,
V 0 (l) = V 0 (L) = cl, V 0 (u) = V 0 (U) = −cu,
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where the two first conditions, called the value matching conditions, determine whether
or not the agent adjusts, in the sense that the benefits from adjusting should equal
the costs from doing so, and the last four conditions, called the smooth pasting con-
ditions, determine the optimal adjustment size.3 Because this is a nonlinear system
of equations, in general, we can only find the solution numerically.
Using the arguments in Bertola and Caballero (1990), by solving a system of
equations, we can find the ergodic distribution for the location of the agent in the z






















































































































































3Although there are four trigger and return points and six equations, the additional two value
matching conditions are needed to determine the two a priori unknown constants in V .
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1z, if z ∈ [L, l] ,
Ac2 +B
c
2z, if z ∈ [l, u] ,
Ac3 +B
c




(l − L) (U + u− l − L) ,
Bc1 =
2
(l − L) (U + u− l − L) ,
Ac2 =
2




(u− U) (U + u− l − L) ,
Bc3 =
2
(u− U) (U + u− l − L) .
We can view a Brownian motion process as the limit of a random walk when
the time interval and the step size go to zero simultaneously at appropriate rates.
This is a useful property because it enables us to characterize some properties of the
Brownian motion process by taking the limit per unit of time of the corresponding
property of the random walk process when the time interval goes to zero. We follow
Bertola and Caballero (1990) and Dixit (1991a) to approximate the continuous-time
process with a discrete-time, discrete state-space Markov chain, which in the limit
converges to the above process. Namely, we consider
zt+∆t =









, and∆t,∆z represent, respectively,
the duration of the discrete-time period and the length of each step taken by z in
each period. If we are considering only arbitrarily small changes, then we would have
dz = σ
√






We now prove that this binomial random walk mimics the main features of the
continuous Brownian motion process, namely,
E (∆zt+∆t) = pz∆z + (1− pz) (−∆z) = μ∆t
V ar (∆zt+∆t) = pz (∆z − μ∆t)2 + (1− pz) (−∆z + μ∆t)2 = σ2∆t
It is also true that, as dt → 0, with dz = σ
√
dt, this random walk converges, in
some appropriate way, to the Brownian motion process (3.1) and (3.2).6 Similarly
to the continuous-time case, for given values of (L, l, u, U) we can find the firm’s
ergodic distribution over z. To do that, we first make a change of scale. Consider
i ∈ M = {0, 1, 2, . . . ,m}, and let Li ≡ 0, Ui ≡ m, li, ui ∈ M . Then we have the
following relation between the values assumed by z, in the discrete-time case, and the
values assumed by i





i (Lz) = Li, i (lz) = li, i (uz) = ui, i (Uz) = Ui.
4In terms of stochastic calculus, we can ignore all terms of higher order than dt. However, if we
were to make a simulation of the model in discrete time, then we should also consider the terms in
(∆t)2.
5Note that the meaning of dz here is different from its meaning in the definition of a Brownian
motion. Here it represents the step size of the binomial random walk, and therefore is a deterministic
quantity, whether in the definition of the Brownian motion process it was representing the stochastic
infinitesimal change in the process.
6See, for example, Cox and Miller (1965).
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Then, for the case where μ 6= 0, we have the following discrete-time density








































































































































For the case where μ = 0, we have




1z, if z ∈ {Lz, . . . , lz} ,
Ad2 +B
d
2z, if z ∈ {lz, . . . , uz} ,
Ad3 +B
d






















(uz − Uz) (Uz + uz − lz − Lz)
.
B.2 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of lemma 1.
We first assume that Lz, lz, uz, and Uz, are chosen so that
|Lz − L| < dz, |lz − l| < dz, |uz − u| < dz, |Uz − U | < dz.
This implies that discrete-time trigger and return points converge to the continuous-
time analogs. Now, note that the discrete-time ergodic distribution function is defined
as
Fd (z; dz) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0, if z < Lz,
[ z−Lzdz ]P
i=0
fd (i× dz + Lz; dz) , if Lz ≤ z ≤ Uz,
1, if z > Uz,
where [x] represents the largest integer not higher than x. Note that Fd is continuous
from the right, has the usual aspect of a ladder, and given the restriction imposed
on fd (see appendix B.1) Fd (Lz; dz) = 0, Fd (Uz; dz) = 1. With respect to the
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continuous-time ergodic distribution, it is defined as
Fc (z) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0, if z < L,R z
L
fc (z) , if L ≤ z ≤ U ,
1, if z > U .
It is obvious that, for z ≤ L or z ≥ U , limdz→0 Fd (z; dz) = Fc (z). We now prove
that it is also true for z ∈ [L, l], and the remaining cases would be similar. First note





















































































































































= z − L,
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Fd (z; dz) = Fc (z) .
Proof of proposition 2.
First of all, note that these are quantities per unit of time. Then, for the job creation
rate we have in discrete-time
E (JC)d =
fd (Lz + dz; dz) qz (lz − Lz)
dt
=











given that dz = σ
√
dt. Now, we will use the fact that
fd (Lz + dz; dz) = Fd (Lz + dz; dz) = Fd (Lz + dz; dz)−2Fd (Lz; dz)+Fd (Lz − dz; dz) ,
since Fd (Lz; dz) = Fd (Lz; dz) = 0. Then, in continuous-time, we will have










































(l − L) .
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For the job destruction rate we have in discrete-time
E (JD)d =
fd (Uz − dz; dz) pz (Uz − uz)
dt
=











For the continuous-time version, we use the fact that
fd (Uz − dz; dz) = −Fd (Uz; dz) + 2Fd (Uz − dz; dz)− Fd (Uz − 2dz; dz) ,
since Fd (Uz; dz) = F (Uz − dz; dz) = 1. Then, in continuous-time, we will have







































(l − L) .
Now, for the variance of the job creation rate, we have
V ar (JC)d = pa [E (JC | b)d −E (JC)d]

















































i = b, r, and qz = paqz|b + qaqz|r, and the third line uses qz|b − qz|r = σaσ . Finally, for
the variance of the job destruction rate, we have
V ar (JD)d = pa [E (JD | b)d −E (JD)d]
















































i = b, r, and pz = papz|b + qapz|r, and the third line uses pz|r − pz|b = σaσ . The result
for the continuous-time versions of the variances is now obvious.
Proof of proposition 4.
The first two results for the job creation rate and job destruction rate are obvious.
For the standard deviations, note that, for example for the job creation case
V ar (JC) = pa [E (JC | b)−E (JC)]2 + qa [E (JC | r)−E (JC)]2
= paqa [E (JC | b)−E (JC | r)]2 ,
sinceE (JC) = paE (JC | b)+qaE (JC | r). Therefore, becauseE (JC) = pE (JC)1+
(1− p)E (JC)2, we have the result that
std (JC) =
√
paqa {p [E (JC | b)1 −E (JC | r)1] +
(1− p) [E (JC | b)2 −E (JC | r)2]}
= p× std (JC)1 + (1− p)× std (JC)2 .
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Proof of corollary 5.
The first result follows directly from propositions 2 and 4. The second result follows
from




Appendices for Chapter 4
C.1 Appendix: The Quadros de Pessoal Database
In this appendix, we discuss the methods used in the empirical exercises on job
reallocation withQuadros de Pessoal (QP). QP is a Portuguese longitudinal database
containing annual information on workers, establishments and firms, and covering
the period 1985-2000. The database originates from a mandatory annual survey run
by the Ministry of Employment, and it covers all economic entities, excluding public
administration, with at least one worker. Information refers to March up to 1993, and
to October since the reformulation of the survey in 1994. The database is composed
of three linkable datasets (separated in annual files): the dataset on workers, the
dataset on establishments, and the dataset on firms. The dataset on firms covers
the period 1985-2000, and in each year it includes an average of 250,000 firms. The
variables are the following:
(i) Firm ID: A unique identifier given to a firm when it first answers the survey.
Some procedures are used to avoid giving a new identification number to an
already existing firm, based mainly on the location of its main establishment.
(ii) Location: It contains information on the firm location up to the second of three
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administrative territorial divisions.
(iii) CAE (SIC): An industrial classification of the firm main activity equivalent to
the 4-digit SIC code. During the reference period, this classification has changed
from “CAE Rev. 1” to “CAE Rev. 2”, starting in 1995.
(iv) Legal nature: It contains information on the firm legal status (public firm,
corporation, joint stock company, partnership, etc.).
(v) Sales: The value, at current prices, of shipments by all firm’s establishments.
(vi) Year of birth: The year in which the firm was created (starting only in 1995).
(vii) Common stock: The shareholders’ equity minus retained earnings.
(viii) Common stock structure: A decomposition of the shareholders’ common stock
into public, private, and foreign owners.
(ix) Number of establishments: The number of establishments the firm currently
holds (starting only in 1994).
(x) Number of employees: The number of employees in all establishments held by
the firm.
Two notes of caution concerning the firms dataset are: first, for each year the
common stock and sales variables are missing for around 40% and 10% of all firms,
respectively; second, a significant fraction of firms change their CAE at some point
in time, but most of these changes keep them in the same 3 or 4—digits CAE.
The dataset on establishments spans the period 1985-2000, and on average includes
300,000 establishments per year. This dataset includes these variables:
(i) Firm ID: The unique identifier of the firm the establishment is included in (see
above).
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(ii) Establishment ID: The unique establishment identifier within the firm Similar
procedures to avoid duplicate entries/exits are employed here, but, apparently,
are much less successful.
(iii) Location: The establishment location (see above).
(iv) CAE (SIC): The establishment industry specialization (see above).
(v) Number of employees: The number of employees at the establishment.
Some notes about this dataset are: first, only 5% of all establishments pertain
to multi-establishment firms, but these make a more significant share of total em-
ployment since they belong to larger firms; second, even though the Ministry of
Employment staff implements routines to avoid false entries and false exits of es-
tablishments, in the dataset there is evidence that they still occur, especially for
multi-establishment firms and around 1990, precisely the year in which the workers
dataset was not processed.
The dataset on workers covers the periods 1985-1989 and 1991-2000, and it in-
cludes an average of 2,500,000 workers per year. The variables are the following:
(i) Firm ID: The unique identifier of the firm the worker is employed in (see above).
(ii) Establishment ID: The unique identifier (within the firm) of the establishment
the worker is attached to (see above).
(iii) Worker ID: The unique worker identifier, which is given by its social security
number.
(iv) Sex: The sex of the worker.
(v) Position: It contains information on the situation of the worker at the firm (boss,
non-self-employed worker, family worker, etc.).
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(vi) Education: The higher educational degree attained by the worker.
(vii) Part/Full-Time: It tells whether the employee is working at full-time, at part-
time, or with no defined schedule.
(viii) Date of birth: The worker’s date of birth.
(ix) Date of hiring: The date when the worker was hired by the firm.
(x) Date of promotion: The date of the last promotion of the worker within the firm.
(xi) Wages: The amount of regular wages, in current prices, earned by the worker.
(xii) Tenure wages: The amount of compensation, in current prices, earned by the
worker that is due to the tenure duration in the current qualification.
(xiii) Overtime wages: The amount of overtime wages, in current prices, earned by
the worker.
(xiv) Grants: The amount of grants, in current prices, received by the worker, de-
composed into regular and irregular grants.
(xv) Regular hours: The number of hours the employee should normally work.
(xvi) Regular hours worked: The actual number of regular hours the employee
worked.
(xvii) Overtime hours worked: The number of overtime hours the employee worked.
(xviii) Profession: The worker’s profession as given by a national classification of
professions.
(xix) Qualification: The qualification associated with the worker’s job at the firm.
(xx) Labor agreement: The specific collective labor agreement under which the work-
ers connection to the firm is partially regulated.
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(xxi) Professional category: The worker’s professional category as specified in the
collective labor agreement by which he is covered.
Given the highly detailed information contained in this dataset, its quality is ques-
tionable in some aspects. First, some variables, such as wages and date of hiring, are
missing for about 10% of the workers in each year. Second, the other components of
worker compensation besides wages only exist for a smaller fraction of the population
of workers (at maximum 50%, and usually around 15%).
Notwithstanding these remarks, the QP is a valuable source of information to
study macroeconomic aspects associated with the reallocation of labor over time,
industrial economics topics such as the size distribution of firms, and labor economics
questions such as the determinants of earnings. One shortcoming of this database
is the absence of information of the firm’s capital stock and materials usage, which
does not enable an analysis of multifactor productivity. Even the analysis of labor
productivity is subject to the problem that some industries and types of firms register
a high incidence of missings
C.2 Appendix: Procedures Used in Analysis of
Quadros de Pessoal
Definitions
We define the rates of job creation (JC ) and job destruction (JD), both for continuing
and entering establishments/firms as in Davis and Haltiwanger (1990). Let i stand
for the i-th unit (firm or establishment), s for the sector the unit is in, and t for the
time period in question. Then the job creation rate among all units, JCst, among






























gist = (List − Lis,t−1) /Xist
where JCst = JCCst + JCBst, List is the number of employees at unit i, in sector s
and period t, Xist is the size of unit i at time t, defined as the average employment
in periods t and t− 1, Lst and Xst have similar definitions but at the sectoral level,
Ist is the set of units relevant for job flows in sector s at time t, ICst the set of units
in sector s at time t that remained in activity from the previous period, and IBst the
set of units that started activity at time t in sector s.
Similarly, the job destruction rates among all units, JDst, among continuing units,



















where JDst = JDCst + JDDst, and IDst is the set of units that exited at time t in
sector s.
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Entering and Exiting Units
We select entering/exiting units at time t by requiring that t/t − 1 was the earli-
est/latest period their ID showed up in the dataset (with positive employment).1
Because there is some incidence of temporary exits, especially among establishments,
we recover all units with only one missing value, and exclude all others in all years
with missing values. For the recovered units, the missing value is taken to be the
average of the two closest years.
However, in the case of establishments, we notice abnormal values of JCB and
JDD in some years. This is especially true around 1990, precisely the year in which
the workers dataset was not processed by the Ministry staff.2 In order to reduce the
amount of false creation and destruction of establishments we adopt the following
rule. We exclude from period t births and deaths all establishments belonging to
firms that in periods t − 2, t − 1, t, and t + 1, have a maximum of simultaneously
operating establishments less than the total number of establishments operating in
those years.3 With this exclusion rate, we are able to obtain smoother values for JCB
and JDD.
Year 1994
In year 1994 the reference month of the survey becomes October instead of March. In
order to reduce proportionally the amount of job flows, we create a new employment
variable referring to March 1994. With probability 7/19 this new variable is randomly
assigned the value in March 1993, and with probability 12/19 it is randomly assigned
1This method is equivalent to selecting entering units in year t as those units whose ID was
higher than the highest ID in t− 1.
2Among establishments, in year 1991 we get JCB = 25.9%, and JDD = 24.4%.
3For year 1986, the rule only includes years 1985 to 1987, and for 2000, the rule only includes
years 1998 to 2000.
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the value in October 1994. That is
npess94a =




npess93, if u > 12
19
.
Harmonization of CAE Codes
The CAE industry classification system was revised in 1995. Therefore, to enable the
longitudinal analysis by economic sector, we adopt the following procedure. First,
we reduce the amount of miscoding by converting all 6-digits CAE Rev. 1 codes into
4-digits CAE Rev. 1 codes. We do this in the CAE variable from 1985 to 1994, and
construct the correspondence table between 6-digits CAE Rev. 2 codes and 4-digits
CAE Rev. 1 codes. Second, we use the information in 1994 and 1995 to construct
a probability transition matrix associated with the transformed equivalence table.
Third, using the transformed equivalence table, for each 5-digits CAE Rev. 2 codes,
we list all possible 4-digits CAE Rev. 1 codes. Starting in 1995, and going iteratively
until 2000, we first select the correctly entered CAE Rev. 2 codes, and check if in
the previous year the unit has one of the 4-digits CAE Rev. 1 codes appearing in the
transformed equivalence table. If that is the case, it becomes the firm’s equivalent
4-digit CAE Rev. 1 code for the current year. If that is not the case, namely for new
births, then we use the transformed equivalence table to randomly select the 4-digits
CAE Rev. 1 code from the set of possible codes associated with the current year
5-digits Rev. 2 code. Finally, because there is some incidence of incorrectly entered
CAE codes, for those 5-digits Rev. 2 codes that are miscoded, we first convert them
into 3-digits Rev. 2 codes and then apply the same procedure as above, but now
using the equivalence table between 3-digits CAE Rev. 2 and 4-digits CAE Rev. 1
codes.
This method seems to be very efficient for correctly allocating units to economic
sectors from 1995 to 2000, as we conclude by looking at a large number of units.
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Proxies for Units’ Age
Concerning the age of each unit, we have two proxies available: the year of birth
variable from the firms dataset and the year of hiring from the workers dataset.
With respect to the year of birth we only have observations from 1995 until 2000. We
assume the age of the firm to be the mode across these years, and try to use all firms
that enter before 1995, survive at least until 1995, and have nonmissings for the year
of birth variable.
With respect to the year of hiring, we first correct and or omit the variable for
erroneous entries, and proceed in two steps. First, for each firm we calculate the
mode, across all years, for each worker with a valid id. Then we take the minimum
across all workers to be the year of entry by the firm. For those firms that do not have
any worker with a valid id, we select the minimum year of birth across all workers in
each year, and then obtain the mode of this minimum across all years.
In the end, we use the proxy constructed from the year of hiring variable, since the
proxy constructed from the year of birth refers to the firm, and not the establishment,
and is only available from 1995 onwards, leaving only 6 years for analysis.
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